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ABSTRACT 
The period after the end of the Cold War the early 1990s, when number of academics would 
continuously label the United States of America (USA), France and the United Kingdom 
(UK) as the only external supremacies to have extensive interests in Sub-Saharan African 
countries such as Angola with the use of the Washington Consensus, has contemporary been 
threatened by the new African economic dependency on China through the Beijing consensus 
(Frieden, 2000, 14). Over the course of the past ten years or so, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) has established itself as a progressively prevailing player across Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Academics have consequently argued that China in Africa has been a theme widely 
discussed lately and one of the questions that centre’s around this discussion; is the Beijing 
Consensus a suitable model for achieving Angola’s development objectives as compared to 
earlier Western attempts through Washington Consensus?.........................................................
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
From as early as the period of the 1960s onwards, African countries such as Angola have 
dedicated themselves to achieving their countries development objectives. After struggling 
for over a decade, Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and subsequently fell 
into an extensive civil war that lasted for 27 years until 2002 (Victoria, 1998, 1). Since the 
end of the war, Angola has focused on post-war reconstruction and has made remarkable 
improvement in the development of its economy, largely pushed by its oil productions 
(Victoria, 1998, 2). Relations with countries that play a leading role in the Global economic 
scale have always been in the forefront of Angola’s development agenda. Angola’s chief 
exports are oil, diamonds, coffee, timber and other mineral resources and the majority of its 
revenues derive from its oil and diamond exports (Adebayo, 2007, 15). Oil is at the heart of 
the Sino-Angolan relationship and the key driver of China’s increasing relations with South-
Central African countries. The Sino-Angolan oil relationship will likely remain significant 
and sustained for the coming decades. One of the most argued aspects of this growing Sino-
Angola relation is closely connected to the question: is the China-Angola relation a better 
model for Angola to achieve its development objectives as compared to the earlier Western 
attempts through the Washington Consensus?   
1.1 Aim and Rationale 
The paper does not intend to replicate the literature already evident in the discourse but rather 
to produce a more balanced view of the China–Angola relation. Precisely, this research paper 
wishes to discuss how China’s contemporary association with Angola should be interpreted; 
successively discussing whether the Beijing Consensus is a suitable model for attaining 
Angola’s development objectives as compared to the earlier Western attempts through the 
Washington Consensus? As it stands, scholars have not focused on how China can become a 
model for Angola’s development objectives. Politically as well as economically, China has 
delivered a substitute development model for Angola’s development objectives. Instead 
issues concerned with China’s impacts on Angola’s development objectives through the use 
of Beijing Consensus as compared to earlier Western attempts through the Washington 
consensus have been mainly focused on. In short, the aim of this paper is to provide a 
detailed discussion of the comparison between the empirical role played by both the 
Washington and the Beijing Consensus towards Angola’s development.  
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1.2 Literature Review  
The year 2006 signifies a historical moment in Africa, it was on this year that the China-
Africa relations were revealed at the November 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China 
and Africa Cooperation (United Nations Publications, 2009, 1148). African leaders gradually 
recognize the need for closer ties with the rising economic giant, calling for resolute efforts to 
better use the opportunities presented by China. The growth in China’s economic and 
political contribution in Angola is arguably the most significant development element on the 
continent since the end of the Cold War (Indira and Alex, 2007, 1). In the past decade, China 
has achieved a visible position in Angola’s economy as its largest trading partner, a major 
provider of funds and the largest operator in the country’s reconstruction (Indira and Alex, 
2007, 2). The increasing cooperation between China and Angola is compelling us to ask 
number of questions concerned with the possible changes that could befall Angola. For 
instance, will Angola develop itself from the benefits obtained from the Sino-Angola relation 
or will it set itself at the risk of yet another colonial experience with China?    
1.3 Methodology  
The research paper uses Angola as a case study to show how China approaches Africa by 
taking risks in African countries which the West has considered rogue states. The hypothesis 
of the research paper proposes that neither the Washington nor the Beijing Consensus is the 
ultimate model of achieving Angola’s development objectives. The research paper will use 
one dependent variable (outcome variable) which is development as the ultimate goal for 
Angola and then two independent variable (explanatory variable), namely the earlier Western 
attempts through the Washington Consensus and China-Angola through the Beijing 
Consensus.  The variance in these variables are used to get deterministic causality; a causal 
relationship between the IV/Explanatory and the DV/Outcome Variable. Then the variance is 
found on the two (IV’s) namely the earlier Western attempts through the Washington 
Consensus and China-Angola relation through the Beijing Consensus. The multiplicity of 
these variables proves the deterministic causality that the research paper sought to prevent 
selection bias. 
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1.4 Process-Tracing Methodology  
Process-tracing is a case-study approach and theory-testing setup that offers an operative 
means of classifying and exploring the possible causal and interactional dynamics which 
inform the independent and dependent variables in research (Detlef, 2002, 30). This method 
is essential in this research for proving the empirical role played by both the Washington and 
the Beijing Consensus towards Angola’s development objectives. In addition process tracing 
will be used to identify the causal process and causal mechanism between the independent 
variable (explanatory variable) and the outcome of the dependent variable. Process-tracing 
will also be used within the research to examine the role played by the leaders of Angola in 
achieving the country’s development objectives. Through the use of processing tracing the 
paper also intends to provide a survey aimed at articulating scholar’s views and thoughts 
around the growing China-Angola relationship. To this extent, the research through the use of 
process tracing will investigate as to why neither the Washington nor the Beijing Consensus 
is the ultimate model of achieving Angola’s development objectives.   
1.5 Research Objectives  
The aim of the research is to address a range of key politico-economic issues relating to the 
Washington and the Beijing Consensus approach towards Angola’s development objectives. 
The core areas of investigation are founded on two central issues; firstly the role played by 
the Washington Consensus towards Angola’s development objectives. When the United 
States emerged as the conquering nation at the end of the Cold War the “Washington 
Consensus” became the only strong trustworthy development model for Angola. With the 
financial crisis in 2008, China’s economic success and Angola’s dependence on China, the 
Washington Consensus started losing its standing in Angola (Wei and Faizullah, 2002, 110). 
The downfall of the Washington Consensus in Angola has been so dramatic that some critics 
argued that the policies imposed were never intended to enhance development (Wei and 
Faizullah, 2002, 111).  On the contrary, the Washington Consensus policies focused a lot on 
the economic aspects of development and leading Angola to serious dependence on loans 
offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Shah 1998-
2013, www.globalissues.org). Now the question is; is the Beijing Consensus a suitable model 
for achieving Angola’s development objectives?  
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The second central issue is the Beijing Consensus’ approach towards Angola’s development 
objectives. The case of the Beijing Consensus is so exclusive that there has been interesting 
debates on it. Just a few decades ago when the Washington Consensus was in the leading 
place with global belief and confidence, no one cared about China’s model of development. 
Some social scientists and economists even prophesied the downfall of the communist regime 
in a near future (Mares, 2001, p: 46). But now, more and more focus has been drawn to the 
Beijing Consensus. China is using tied aid to advance the business opportunities for Chinese 
companies in Angola and to surface the way for enormous investment missions (Yasutami 
and Hideo, 2013, 106). It is no wonder that China is concentrating its investment and aid 
strategies in Angola. With the above short satisfactory comparison of both the Washington 
and the Beijing Consensus, the research paper also aims to argue that neither the Washington 
nor the Beijing Consensus in the dominant discourse is an appropriate model for attaining 
Angola’s development objectives. Both the Washington and the Beijing Consensus are not 
intended to save Angola from the resource curse in which the profits from commodity exports 
serve only the interests of the countries elites and manifest negative effects towards achieving 
development objectives. China’s interest in Angola is not completely different from those of 
the Western powers. It is this research paper’s crucial aim to provide conceptual insight into 
such knowledge.     
1.6 Research Method  
The methodology that is going to be used in this study is the qualitative method. The data 
collection based on qualitative method would be imperative because this study requires an 
extensive gathering of data from library research resources. The research paper will use a 
single case study approach to illustrate how those specific independent variables play similar 
roles in producing the same dependable variable. This study relies significantly more on 
secondary data such as books, journals as well as articles and primary sources based on 
conducting email and in person interviews. In pursuing this research, this paper relies on a 
qualitative single case study approach. The qualitative approach will be used because this 
research does not rely more on measurement or statistics. The topic of China and Angola has 
suggested considerable amount of explanation in academic literature. A number of books and 
articles exist on the relationship of China and Angola and will mostly be used thoroughly 
throughout the research paper.     
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1.7 Chapter Outline  
Chapter 1:“Introduction”, Chapter one introduces and sketches the questions that have 
encouraged this study. This Chapter outlines the important aspects of this paper such as the 
aim and rationale, literature review, hypothesis as well as the research method. Chapter 2: 
“Historical Overview of China-Angola Relations?” This chapter aims to introduce the reader 
to the concept of China-Angola relation, effectively discussing Angola’s historical 
background. In addition discuss what is meant by development.  Explain the main features of 
China’s interaction with Angola? Chapter two will also seek to discuss the main features of 
China’s Foreign Policy pillars towards Angola. Provide an acceptable discussion of China’s 
evolving role in Angola?  Lastly bring about suitable closing remarks. Chapter 3: “The 
Washington Consensus Assessment”: This chapter will firstly define what the Washington 
Consensus is. In addition discuss the earlier Western attempts through the Washington 
Consensus. Evaluating the empirical role played by the Washington Consensus towards 
Angola’s development objectives. In addition this chapter will observe the role played by the 
key Washington Consensus institutions such as the IMF and WB.  Lastly bring about 
appropriate closing comments.  
Chapter 4: “China-Angola assessment (The Beijing Consensus)”: This chapter will firstly 
define what is meant by Beijing Consensus.  From the Washington to the Beijing consensus, 
discusses the new road towards the development of Angola. Also evaluate the empirical role 
played by China through the use of the Beijing Consensus, such as the  eight principles 
declared by China for economic aid and technical assistance in Angola. China’s presence in 
Angola presents a fascinating case study of China’s oil interest in Africa and there is a 
complex interplay of benefits and challenges. Lastly convey about proper departing 
comments. Chapter 5: “The performance under the Consensuses”: In order to achieve a 
detailed analysis, this chapter will provide applicable criticisms of both the Washington and 
the Beijing Consensus approach towards Angola’s development objectives. In addition 
chapter five will offer suggestions on how Angola can manage a balanced relationship with 
this strong growing economy and satisfactory suggestions for Angola’s development. Chapter 
6: “The Conclusion”: In conclusion the paper aims to bring about suitable implications 
towards attaining Angola’s development objectives, highlight all the important points that 
have been addressed within the content of the research paper as well as providing concluding 
remarks.   
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CHAPTER 2: AFRICA’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SINO-AFRICA 
RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Scholars have acknowledged that Africa is a land of riches, in the form of natural resources 
which could possibly aid in its development objectives. After a strenuous struggle African 
people finally regained their freedom, conquered colonialism and ended apartheid in South 
Africa, and have since made significant developments and retained their democratic status. 
Ensuring their freedom, African countries have been working on establishing development 
objectives suitable for their national conditions, seeking peace and economic stability by joint 
efforts. Due to the concentrated purpose of African countries and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) which later turned to be the African Union (AU), the condition in Africa has 
been stable in many countries, regional conflicts are being resolved and economy has been 
growing for years (Li, 2006, 167). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
has highlighted a rather optimistic representation of African development and has assisted 
African countries who desired to participate in the world system (Li, 2006, 167). African 
states are playing an increasingly significant part in the international affairs; however Africa 
still faces many challenges on its road to development (Li, 2006, 167). One can therefore 
argue that with the determined efforts of African countries and frequent help from the 
international actors such as China; Africa can deal efficiently with its challenges and achieve 
development. 
China and Africa have an extensive history of diplomatic relations which dates back to the 
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) period. When the PRC was founded in 1949, the Sino-Africa 
relations became significantly visible in the international spectrum. Before 1949, Africa was 
of no importance to China, however from then onwards, China pursued international 
recognition and political partners with the hope of strengthening its international associations 
against the capitalist West and the revisionist communist Soviet Union (Zhang, Date not 
available, 11). Amongst few things, the one thing African countries have in common with 
China is their shared history and their perception of white dominance by the West. 
Declarations such as ‘we all belong to the Third World; we are all developing countries’ were 
usually heard at this period (Judith, 2006, 2). During this stage China supported African 
countries economically, provided technical and military assistance in an attempt to contain 
the dominant Western powers and create a new political as well as international order (Judith, 
2006, 3). African states were at the same time looking for partners to help them win their 
fight for independence and financial support to fund these struggles. From 1966 to 1969, 
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Chinese attention diverted towards Africa due to domestic changes and the great proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (Zhang, Date not available, 12). After internal disputes had been settled, 
China began to establish new relationships on the African continent. When one looks at the 
Sino-Africa relation, one easily recognises that China provides a new alternative direction, 
which in fact could be the foundation of a new global paradigm. Whether its oil in Angola, 
timber in Mozambique or copper in Zambia, it cannot be doubtful that China is bringing new 
life into these African economies (Sanusha and Daisy 2008, 1). All over Africa today the 
Chinese’ existence has been felt; be it through the Chinese construction firms building 
railroads, highways, telecoms, enormous dams, even presidential palaces  (Uche, 2008, 11). 
This is due to their solid understanding of what African countries have had to overcome and 
their continued support of Africa’s struggle for freedom (Uche, 2008, 11). In addition China 
understands that Africa must redress the inequities of its past through broad-based black 
economic empowerment and rapid skills development in order to be successful (Uche, 2008, 
11). Furthermore China is eager and able to help Africa through investment, technology and 
skills transfer and constructive partnerships. For pessimists China signifies a frightening risk 
while for optimists it is a tempting chance (Sanusha and Daisy 2008, 1). Having provided 
such a discussion one can therefore ask if China’s engagement in Africa is morally extractive 
or have a developmental impact as compared to earlier Western attempts through Washington 
Consensus. 
2.1 What is meant by development? 
Before this paper thoroughly discusses the links between China and African development, it 
is firstly important to briefly explain what development is. Individuals recognize 
development as improvement in skill and ability; not only as capital accumulation and 
economic growth but also improvement in the standard of living (Lea, 2010, 150). 
Development that includes growth, embraces aspects of life such as social justice, equal 
opportunities for all citizens, equitable distribution of income and the democratisation of the 
development process (Lea, 2010, 150). Rodney argues that development implies both 
increase in output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangement by which it is 
produced (Rupert, 1998, 71). In other words, development is a multi-dimensional concept and 
in spite of the various conceptions, development is basically about the process of changes 
which lies around the spheres of societal life (Rupert, 1998, 71).  
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When discussing the role played by both the Washington Consensus and the Beijing 
Consensus with regards to Angola’s development, it is important to discuss what each model 
views as development. Generally, the Washington Consensus has been alarmed with pure 
economic growth, considering that the ‘trickle‐down’ theory of economics would certify that 
any newly‐developed wealth would be equally spread throughout society (Patrick, 2008, 9). 
Interchangeably, the Beijing Consensus highlighted equivalent wealth distribution, where 
what matters is not the overall economic growth but how people have access to this growth 
(Patrick, 2008, 9).  
2.2 China’s evolving Role in Africa 
There have been enquiries as to the reasons why Chinese officials decided to cross seas, 
travelling a distance of approximately 11 236.5km which is more than 12 hours of travelling 
time just to invest their resources in Africa. The question that has always been asked by many 
is; what exactly are the Chinese officials here for and what is China’ interest in Africa? In 
search for answers to these questions, one can pay attention to the words of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Liu who stated “China needs Africa” (Kohli, 2009, 
3). In support of his argument, he held that China needs Africa for resources to fuel China’s 
development goals, for markets to sustain its growing economy and for political alliances to 
support its aspirations to be globally influential (Kohli, 2009, 3). One of the main features of 
China’s interaction is the one-China principle, which maintains that Taiwan is part of PRC 
(Lijun, 2002, 129). The notion of Taiwan being part of China is essentially one of the 
political conditions imposed on Chinese diplomatic relations with most African countries 
(Lijun, 2002, 129).  The African continent offers profitable opportunities for China because it 
holds natural resources in areas where Western countries and Multi National Cooperation’s 
(MNC’s) hesitate to occupy or invest (Robert, 2009, 9). China offers aid and military kit to 
countries irrespective of their style or quality of governance and of their human rights records 
(Frank, 2013, 10). China maintains diplomatic relations with and encourages state-owned 
companies to invest in resource rich regions (Robert, 2009, 9). China tends to support high-
profile infrastructure projects such as the building of stadiums, dams, railroads, state houses, 
ministry buildings, hospital and industrial plants when it comes to funding (Frank, 2013, 9).  
It is important for one to note that China is following a structure that is based on doing things 
that other donors have chosen not or have failed to do. 
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 The Beijing consensus is using strategies that Western companies and countries cannot or 
will not emulate or put in place, especially in most problematic countries like Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe. (Frank, 2013, 9). China’s extensive 
industrial growth is playing a vast part in the scramble for the exploitation of Africa’s 
resources. China is at present, the world’s second largest consumer of oil, and Africa has 
become China’s alternative source of oil imports (John, 2009, 42). There is an important 
existence of Chinese companies across African countries, amongst others, Sudan, Angola, 
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Niger, and Central African Republic of Congo. 
These companies are involved in a variety of activities ranging from the construction of 
pipelines to oil and gas exploration. West African oil is particularly appealing to the Chinese 
companies because of its light, high quality, waxy and low in sulphur properties, which is 
similar to the grade used in the domestic oil market (John, 2009, 42-43). Another bonus is 
that, apart from Nigeria, West African producers do not belong to the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel and are therefore not obliged to abide by the 
group’s production and export caps. With the volatility in the Middle East creating 
uncertainty in the global oil supply chain, especially with regard to sustainable long term 
access to crude oil provisions, Africa has indeed become an attractive destination for China’s 
energy security. Already Africa accounts for 30% of China’s oil imports with prevalence of 
China’s three big state-owned oil companies namely China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec (Ana, 
2010, 17).   
Chinese attention in Africa ranges beyond oil interest. China presently ranks as the 
continent's second highest trading partner, behind the United States, and ahead of France and 
Britain. From 2002 to 2003, trade between China and Africa doubled to $18.5 billion; by 
2007, it had reached $73 billion (Stephanie, 2008, 2). A significant sum of these growths was 
due to increased Chinese imports of oil from Sudan and other African nations, but Chinese 
firms also import a significant amount of non-oil commodities such as timber, copper, and 
diamonds (Stephanie, 2008, 2). China lately began to import some African factory-made 
value-added goods, such as processed foods and household consumer goods. Specialists say 
Chinese companies perceive Africa as both an outstanding marketplace for their low-cost 
customer goods, and a growing economic opportunity as more countries privatize their 
productions and open their economies to foreign investment (Stephanie, 2008, 2). 
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 With 48 African countries having official diplomatic relations with China, Beijing is now 
understood as an appreciated different partner that can help Africa reverse its 
underdevelopment challenges. Even leaders like Presidents Mbeki and Obansanjo who are 
regarded by the West to be influential and visionary leaders in addressing Africa’s 
governance and development problems, have recognized that China’s increasing importance 
in the global economy forces Africa to change its interests with China given the fact that both 
share a mutual bond of interests with respect to their position and understanding of the 
development crisis in the South (Kwadwo and Martin, 2006, 76). 
China pursues to institutionalize its association with Africa and the two have involved in 
several meetings to advance their bilateral associations. China’s key objectives in the area of 
development cooperation are laid down in the FOCAC. Established in 2000, FOCAC 
ministerial summits take place every three years, alternatively in China and then Africa (Ian, 
2010, 1). The years since 2000 have seen growing economic, political and diplomatic 
interests in Sino-African relations, attracting global attention towards China’s engagement in 
Africa (Ian, 2010, 1). This has led to increasing exploration, research and studies which seek 
to better understand Sino-African partnerships and cooperation. FOCAC has deepened Sino-
African associations in numerous ways that include politics, economics, investments, trade 
and aid amongst many. For Chinese and African officials, FOCAC constitutes a multilateral 
platform to evaluate the achievements and discuss the perspectives of Sino-African relations 
(Ian, 2010, 1). 
The first Forum met in October 2000 in Beijing and was attended by nearly 80 ministers from 
44 African countries (Ian, 2010, 72). The second ministerial conference was held in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 and passed the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) 
(Ian, 2010, 73). The FOCAC Summit and the third ministerial conference were held in 
Beijing from November 2006, while FOCAC IV met in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in November 
2009 (Ian, 2010, 73). The FOCAC V met in Beijing in July 2012 and exclusively focused on 
consolidating a sustainable partnership between China and African countries (Ian, 2010, 73). 
The establishment of the FOCAC in 2000 has become the vehicle that has institutionalized 
this symbolic diplomacy. Since its commencement FOCAC has paved and expanded political 
and economic ties between Beijing and Africa’s leaders and has provided the drive to be 
reflected as a Beijing Consensus alternative development element (Ian, 2010, 1).   
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2.3 What are the main features of China’s interaction with Angola? 
The Republic of Angola is a country in the Southern Africa, bordered by Namibia on the 
south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the north, and Zambia on the east as shown 
on the Appendix Fig 1. China’s official relations with Angola are of current origin (Corkin, 
2011, 1). China’s engagement in Angola dates back to the early years of the anticolonial 
struggle through its support for the three major liberation movements in the country namely 
the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA) (Corkin, 2011, 1). China supported all three liberation movements during the anti-
colonial struggle, yet it refused to recognize the MPLA government and continued to support 
UNITA after 1975 (Corkin, 2011, 1). Diplomatic relations between Beijing and Luanda were 
only established in 1983 (Corkin, 2011, 1). Relations during the 1990s were mainly 
associated with the defence cooperation and acquisition of Chinese fire arms. With the end of 
the Angolan conflict in 2002 the relations amongst the two countries progressed to economic 
collaboration, with a particular focus on Angola’s reconstruction and development 
programme and on Angola’s oil (Corkin, 2011, 1). Angola is currently China’s top African 
trading partner. In 2009 39 percent of Angola’s crude exports were allocated to China. This 
accounts for 15.7 percent of China’s total oil imports, making Angola one of the largest 
sources of China’s oil imports (Corkin, 2011, 1). Chinese construction companies are the 
main players in the reconstruction of Angola’s infrastructure as indicated in Fig 5: showing 
the Chinese-Built Housing Development in Angola a Ghost Town. Officially, over 30 000 
Chinese citizens are working in Angola, mostly as low-skilled contract labourers for Chinese 
companies (Corkin, 2011, 1). However, this number also includes Chinese micro-
entrepreneurs and small business operators. The continuous need for state officials to travel to 
and from China and Angola, respectively, has led to the establishment of direct flights 
between the two countries.     
China’s growing role in Angola has caused discussions and speculations. From both the 
Angolan and Chinese viewpoints, the association is realistic and premeditated. On the 
occasion of the Chinese prime minister’s visit to Angola in June 2006, President dos Santos 
stated simply that “China needs natural resources and Angola wants development” (USA 
International Business Publications, 2006, 176). Relations between the Washington 
Consensus international financial institutions namely IMF and the WB and Angola had been 
poor for years. At the end of the Angola war in 2002, the IMF and many Western donors 
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wanted Angola to negotiate a staff-monitored program (SMP) and show good performance 
for three trimesters before being eligible to receive financial support (Corkin, 2011, 2). An 
SMP would give integrity to Angola’s economic policies and open the way for a donor 
conference to increase funds to rebuild the country. However, the Angolan government felt it 
could not agree to IMF conditionality’s, and after numerous series of consultations they 
proclaimed that they would no longer seek to arrange an IMF agreement (USA International 
Business Publications, 2006, 177). From Angola’s perspective, the Chinese provide funding 
for strategic post-conflict reconstruction projects that Western donors have chosen not to 
fund. Chinese financing offers better conditions than commercial loans, lower interest rates, 
and longer repayment time. Angola has within five years become one of the most prosperous 
economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Jennifer, 2008, 33). Powered by record-high international 
oil prices and strong growth in both the oil and non-oil sector, Angola has experienced 
remarkably high growth rates in recent years (Jennifer, 2008, 33). With the war now over, 
rapid post-conflict reconstruction has become the government’s main concern. The PRC has 
in particular played an important role in assisting these efforts. Chinese financial and 
technical assistance has kick-started over 100 projects in the areas of energy, water, health, 
education, telecommunications, fisheries, and public works (Jennifer, 2008, 34).   
2.4 Main features of China’s Foreign Policy pillars towards Angola 
In less than a decade, China has achieved to shape out a noticeable position in Angola’s 
economy as its largest trading partner, a major supplier of funds and the largest operator in 
the country’s construction project (Ian, 2010, 28). Several specialists suggest that the need to 
secure natural resources whether oil, metal, or timber is the driving factor of Chinese foreign 
policy toward Angola (Ian, 2010, 28). Indeed, China’s manufacturing sector has shaped a 
massive demand for aluminium, copper, nickel, iron ore, and oil (Ian, 2010, 29). 
Nevertheless, oil rests the key component in bilateral associations, since it includes all 
features of China’s economic commitment with Angola: credit lines for infrastructure are oil 
backed, oil imports dominate bilateral trade and the largest share of Chinese investment in the 
country is directed towards the oil industry (Ian, 2010, 29). Attractive unity and cooperation 
with African countries has continuously been an important component of China’s 
independent foreign policy of peace (André, 2013, 11). The overall standards and purposes of 
China’s Angola foreign policy are as follows, firstly mutual benefit, reciprocity and common 
prosperity (André, 2013, 11). In the first pillar China supports Angola’s need for economic 
development and national development, carries out cooperation in various forms in the 
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economic development (André, 2013, 11). The second pillar is joint support and close 
management, China will strengthen cooperation with Angola in the United Nations (UN) and 
other multilateral corporations (André, 2013, 11). Third pillar is investment, the Chinese 
government inspires and supports Chinese enterprises investment and businesses in Angola 
and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer praises (André, 2013, 11-12). The 
last and controversial pillar amongst many is the pillar of non-interference (André, 2013, 12). 
This pillar entails that China does not intend to pressure the Angolan governments in any 
manner; it assists in matters of economic agenda as adequately demonstrated in the Appendix 
Fig 2.  China’s Foreign Policy pillars towards Angola are encapsulated in the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence, namely: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity; non-
aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and 
peaceful coexistence (André, 2013, 11).    
 2.5 Provide an acceptable discussion of China’s evolving role in Angola  
Angola has been categorized as a rogue state that comprises of patronage and corruption 
(Jian, 2011, 80).  Angola is an autocratically ruled state that is notorious for corruption, 
incompetence, and persistent poverty (Robert and Rachel, 2007, 76). It was ranked forty-two 
of forty-eight sub-Saharan African states on the 2007 Index of African Governance list 
(Robert and Rachel, 2007). Human Rights Watch reported that in a five-year period, $4.2 
billion worth of oil revenues were siphoned off of Angola’s public accounts (Robert and 
Rachel, 2007, 75). This sums to about 10 percent of GDP, in a country where the citizens 
survive on less than $2 day (Robert and Rachel, 2007, 76). Because of this, in 2004 the IMF 
was attaching transparency arrangement to the loans it provided Angola for post-war 
reconstruction efforts. The ruling elite were reluctant to sign this new arrangement, however 
the desperate need for further funding prevailed. Suddenly, China’s Exim Bank came forward 
with an offer to provide $2 billion worth of loans, with no conditionality’s regarding 
corruption or transparency attached. Angola abandoned the funding agreements of the IMF 
and contracted to provide China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day (Robert and Rachel, 2007, 
76). The Angolan government argued that Western financial markets impose “conditions on 
developing countries that are nearly always unbearable and sometimes even politically 
unacceptable” (Ian, 2007 90). It is without argument that China is the leading player in 
Angola’s associations; it is therefore important for one to note that China-Angola association 
is based on the following three components, firstly:   
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Loan 
Angola is currently improving from a horrific thirty-year civil war and donors are assisting in 
the much-needed reconstruction of institutions and the economy. China is the major player 
among these donors, assisting in infrastructure reconstruction. China offers Angola ‘soft’ 
loans with no additional political conditions attached. The Chinese Exim Bank has been a key 
instrument in facilitating the expanding economic cooperation between China and Angola. 
Between 2004 and 2010, China’s Exim Bank has stretched a total of 10.5 billion of US 
dollars in oil-backed credit lines to the Angolan Government. In January 2005 the Chinese 
Exim bank extended a $1 billion oil backed loan to Angola, which was later doubled and 
increased to $3 billion in 2006 for the reconstruction and advancement of infrastructure 
destroyed by the civil war (China in Africa, 2008, page number not available). The Standard 
in Beijing proclaimed that Sinopec had taken up a 40% stake in the profitable oil Block after 
the agreements between the two states. At present Angola has replaced Saudi Arabia as 
China’s leading oil supplier (China in Africa, 2008, page number not available). These loans 
were specifically planned to ease public investment in Angola (China in Africa, 2008, page 
number not available). According to the terms of the loans, Chinese companies are mainly 
contracted to undertake essential projects and are paid directly by China Exim Bank. The 
loans are provided on generous terms compared to European and American Banks’ oil-
backed financing.  
The money offered to Angola in terms of loans is accountable for reconstruction and 
development projects such as railways, electricity and administrative buildings. However, the 
terms of the agreement are advantageous for China seeing that 70% of the construction 
projects are to be allocated to Chinese companies. Domestic contractors can be awarded only 
30% of the projects covered by the loan, a fact that is causing worry among Angolan 
businessmen (China in Africa, 2008, page number not available). The loans offered are not 
creating chances for Angolans to better their lives, which are vital for the livelihoods of the 
local people. A second significant term of the loan agreements is that China can import 
10,000 barrels of oil a day from Angola. Angola currently exports 25% of its oil to China 
(China in Africa, 2008, page number not available). The loan, which was originally 
envisioned for the reconstruction of the country, is being used for other commitments as well. 
According to Global spectator, some of the money has been used for government propaganda 
in the 2006 elections and declared that part of the problem lies in the country’s reluctance to 
be more transparent about its oil revenues (Anming, 2004, 19). 
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Natural Resources 
China is presently the fastest growing economy in the world, with a yearly growth rate of 
around 8% (Anming, 2004, 23). But such rapid economic development in the post-Maoist era 
has required a stable and growing supply of oil (Anming, 2004, 23). A major change came 
about in 1993, when China became an energy importer as an alternative of a net exporter. 
China’s demand for natural resources makes it second largest oil importer after the US. It is 
estimated that the Chinese demand for oil will increase by 156% between the years 2001 and 
2025 (Anming, 2004, 23). In 2004 two sided trade totalled $4.9 billion, representing an 
increase of more than 113 per cent from 2003 (Taylor, 2006, 946). Chinese companies 
remain to look for safe oil deliveries and Angola, as sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil 
producer, is vibrant to this policy (Taylor, 2006, p: 947).  Accordingly, throughout a visit by 
Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyang, an overall of nine cooperation contracts with Angola were 
signed, three of which related to oil (Taylor, 2006, p: 947).  
Investment  
In addition to oil trade, China has meaningfully increased its foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to Angola in recent years (Fantu, 2011, 200). While the largest Chinese operations in Angola 
are focused in oil exploration and construction, there has also been a dramatic increase in 
non-oil Chinese FDI to Angola. The Angolan government through its National Agency for 
Private Investment (ANIP) enthusiastically endorses private investment by Angolan and 
foreign nationals by providing tax incentives in targeted industry sectors and development 
zones (Fantu, 2011, 201). As of December 2007, 51 Chinese firms were registered with ANIP 
(Fantu, 2011, 201). Over 50 percent of these firms were involved in construction; others are 
involved in retail trade of foodstuff products, manufacturing of rubber products, mineral 
water bottling, and other light industries. Chinese FDI to Angola is expected to grow in the 
next few years as new mutual aid contracts are signed by the two countries to attract potential 
investors, providing credible legal protection and steadiness to their investment (Fantu, 2011, 
200). 
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CHAPTER 3: WASHINGTON CONSENSUS ASSESSMENT 
An expected amount of the Washington Consensus interpretations exist in association with 
regions in the world that have applied its principles. For Africa, the presentation of reforms 
included under the term has been useful to a certain extent as a guide to economic policy 
making with the main focus on fiscal discipline and privatization even though it has been 
difficult for most African countries to pursue all of them. Few countries around the world 
have applied the reforms of the Washington Consensus completely this is because some of 
them are culturally and historically sensitive. A larger struggle has been the fact that the 
reform agenda only partially addresses the growth constraints faced by many developing 
countries. Even though Africa remains minimal to the globalisation process, the continent’s 
future development prospects are nevertheless deeply influenced by the global platform 
(Brian, 2004, 215). The Washington Consensus principles have been applied in a number of 
countries including Angola, although as John Williamson, in his review of the Washington 
Consensus argued, sub-Saharan Africa moved spottily and reluctantly, too often under 
foreign pressure rather than out of conviction (Brian, 2004, 215). However, South Africa’s 
former Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, has argued in one of his finance and 
development article that few African countries have applied all the reforms because of the 
difficulties of pursuing them and it is not clear that some of the proposals contained in the 
Washington Consensus are appropriate to Africa’s needs (Brian, 2004, 215). In particular, 
there are problems with the emphasis on privatisation and fiscal reform and trade 
liberalisation (Brian, 2004, 215).  
The nature of globalisation has rendered it difficult for African countries to apply the 
Washington Consensus reforms and at the same time benefit from globalisation. In specific, 
one would argue that the dependence of many African economies on a narrow range of 
resources has made it tough for them to commence the suggested reforms (Brian, 2004, 215). 
In turn, some of the reforms that have been mainly undertaken with respect to the role of the 
state have made it difficult for African countries to deal with the more open trade 
environment (Brian, 2004, 215). While acknowledging that the problems of African 
development have an important domestic dimension, my brief remarks will focus on 
Angola’s application and outcome of the Washington Consensus principles.   
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3.1 What is Washington Consensus? 
During his visit to India on the 6
th
 of November 2010, the United States President Barack 
Obama suggested as to which development models would be appropriate for different 
developing countries, especially Africa where there has not been any clear-cut development 
philosophy. Ahead of Obama, Larry Summers, Obama's economic policy point-man, in New 
Delhi, India noted China’s and India’s development successes and then grappled with 
whether China’s Beijing Consensus or India’s Mumbai Consensus was better for the rest of 
the developing world (Pambazuka News, 2010, page not available).  With Brazil’s success 
over the years that has seen millions of Brazilians move out of poverty and build an economy 
in which the middle class is the popular, we can safely say there is an alternative 
development model for developing countries (Pambazuka News, 2010, page not available). 
That makes the African region as the only place without a prominent developmental 
Consensus distilled from Africa. Such issues have cropped up because the central 
Washington Consensus has been dictating development doctrine for the developing world 
since 1989, particularly Africa which is disadvantaged in the international political economy 
and which has had crisis-wrecked economic development (Pambazuka News, 2010, page not 
available).  
The Washington Consensus has been thought to refer to a set of broadly free market 
economic ideas, supported by prominent economists and international organisations, such as 
the IMF, the WB, the EU and the US (Tejvan, 2013, Not Available). Since 1989, when 
economist John Williamson first regarded the Washington Consensus, which is primarily 
economic and policy recommendations (Williamson, 1989), it became commonly recognised 
as the most effective model by which developing nations could spur growth. Taking on ideals 
of free-market capitalism, which encompassed open trade policies, privatization, and 
deregulation, the Washington Consensus delivered a recommendation for development in the 
Third World (Tejvan, 2013, Not Available). The Washington Consensus is exclusively based 
on ten policy recommendations. The recommendations are as follows:  fiscal discipline; 
restructuring public/social expenditure priorities; tax reform; liberalizing interest rates; 
competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization; liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment; privatization; deregulation; and, property rights (Williamson, 2004: 1-2). These 
principles, particularly those regarding liberalization, privatization, and deregulation are 
closely associated with the neoliberal ideology, or “market fundamentalism,” which espouses 
free-market capitalism as its core tenet (Williamson, 2004: 1-2).  
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As argued by certain scholars, the Implementations of the Washington Consensus have had 
noticeably mixed results such as stagnation and recession during the financial turmoil of the 
1990s and may ultimately have led to the collapse of several nations’ economic systems 
(Williamson, 2004: 3). One of the most significant shortcomings of the Washington 
Consensus was that, while it provided a respectable mixture of reforms to both stabilize the 
economy and encourages private sector activity; it did very little to aid resolve structural and 
institutional constraints on growth. John Williamson pointed this out in his 2002 speech at the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” when 
he questioned why so little of development economics had made their way into Washington 
thinking (Williamson, 2004: 5). Three features of development economics are predominantly 
applicable to African economies and their growth problem: the “dual” economy, the creation 
of social capital, and the role of the state (Williamson, 2004: 5). The Washington Consensus 
implicitly assumed that there was nothing wrong with the development assistance 
relationship it provided, however without doubt, from an African perspective, development 
assistance has tended to undermine growth prospects, even if it has assisted in the filling of 
the investment savings gap. 
3.2 Earlier Western attempts through Washington Consensus 
The Western attempts through Washington Consensus can be easily understood through the 
historical role of the West by using the term “foreign aid”, which meant military assistance 
for the Angolan public for most of the 20
th
 century. The role of Washington Consensus in 
Angola is more prevalent in Angola’s historical moments, it is therefore essential to evaluate 
these events in order to effectively establish the role played by the Washington consensus. 
Following the 1975 war of independence from Portugal, the country broke out into civil war. 
The war was fought between the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA and a number of other 
political parties (Victoria, 1998, 1). During this time Angola was facing an enormous 
agricultural crisis, which harshly limited the source of food. The Soviets and the US provided 
aid and it is understood that the US donated over 100 million dollars’ worth of food (Victoria, 
1998, 1). By the end of the 1980’s the foreign powers had almost completely pulled out of 
Angola and it looked as if peace and democracy was on the horizon. However this was not 
actually the case and Angola once again fell into civil war following failed elections in the 
early 1990’s (Victoria, 1998, 2).  
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The year 1993 marked a turning point for Angola in terms of foreign aid because the United 
States formally recognized the Angolan government and initiated diplomatic relations with it. 
Much of their motivations were most likely linked with the Angolan oil reserves. However, 
the US was involved in several humanitarian and development strategies in Angola during 
the 1990’s. But as war continued to escalate in the country through the 1990’s the aid 
provided was inadequate and unpredictable. In 2002 the Angolan government achieved some 
entrance of peace and steadiness and since then the US government has intensely increased 
the amount of foreign aid expenditure towards Angola (Mike, 2013, Not Available). In the 
early 2000’s the aid was focussed towards more post-war humanitarian initiatives but in 2005 
the US changed to moving towards a full development agenda (Mike, 2013, Not Available). 
US agencies like the United States Agency of International (USAI) development were 
involved in projects including agriculture, healthcare, education and economic growth (Mike, 
2013, Not Available). However, while the US may remain the main and most persuasive 
donor to Angola many other wealthy nations across Europe and Asia have donated 
significantly to Angola (Mike, 2013, Not Available).  
3.3 Evaluate the empirical role played by Washington Consensus towards Angola’s 
development objectives 
During the pre and early 1980s period the Washington Consensus was assisting Angola 
immensely through foreign assistance grants. In 1984 gross official development help from 
multilateral institutions rose to US $33 million, nearly double the figure for 1979 (Thomas, 
1991, 121). Foreign aid was likely to rise in the late 1980s as an outcome of Angola's 
arrangement to the Lomé Convention in April 1985, making the country qualified for funding 
under the Lomé III Agreement, which was to remain in effect until 1990 (Thomas, 1991, 
121). The Lomé Conventions are arrangements setting the outline for mutual aid on 
development policy, economic policy, trade and industry between the West and what are 
recognized as the ACP countries (states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) (Christopher 
and Jane, 2001, 51). Given the fact that Angola did not adequately meet the Washington 
Consensus conditionality’s, Angola had to negotiate for most direct aid provided by Western 
organizations. Because of the mid-1980s crisis in local agricultural production, food imports 
were vital to feed the people and Angola had to plea for more than US $100 million in food 
aid. Nevertheless, this aid did not solve the food crisis. In addition, Angola also appealed for 
US $21 million in non-food aid in 1987, most of which was reserved for survival items 
(Thomas, 1991, 122).  
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A vast amount of direct aid was provided by Western organizations and Angola was trying to 
improve its relations with several Western countries to negotiate for further assistance 
(Angola Foreign Assistance. 1989, Not Available). In addition to assistance provided by the 
UN and the World Food Programme (WFP), in the late 1980s the West was providing help 
through the Lomé III Agreement as well as through the European Investment Bank. 
Moreover, Angola frequently received aid from Sweden for numerous small-scale 
development schemes and France offered some help tied to the purchase of French equipment 
(Angola Foreign Assistance. 1989, Not Available). Angola has improved relations with the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and prospered in getting an agreement in 
1987 with that country for 3,600 tons of food aid (Angola Foreign Assistance. 1989, Not 
Available). Likewise, Portugal approved in 1987 to provide US $140 million in credits 
toward the recovery of Angolan businesses hurt by the migration of Portuguese settlers after 
independence and to cooperate in some joint economic ventures with the Angolan 
government (Angola Foreign Assistance. 1989, Not Available).  
3.4 Assess the role played by the key Washington Consensus institutions such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
The IMF and the WB perceives development as a process of systemic transformation through 
modernisation and industrialisation driven by domestic consumption and domestically 
financed capital accumulation. According to the Washington consensus, African countries are 
poor because of misconceived state intervention, corruption and inefficiency and misguided 
economic incentives, certain Washington scholar further this list by adding lack of capital, 
machines, infrastructure and money as some of the main reasons why poor countries remain 
poor. Development is the inevitable result of a set of ‘appropriate’ incentives and outward-
looking neoclassical economic policies, including fiscal restraint, privatisation, the abolition 
of government intervention on prices, labour market ‘flexibility’, and trade, financial and 
capital account liberalisation  (Alfredo, 2010, 9). Under the Washington Consensus the WB 
set the program for the study of development, with the Bank and the IMF imposing the 
standards of orthodoxy within development economies imposing the appropriate policies 
through the conditionality’s imposed on poor countries facing balance of payments, fiscal or 
financial crises  (Alfredo, 2010, 9). It is obvious that this arrangement of policies, rules and 
motivations are intended to reduce the economic role of states (Alfredo, 2010, 9). With the 
Washington Consensus scholars, there is very little description of what the end-state would 
look like if they followed the principles, seemingly all countries would ultimately look like 
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the United States.  Angola has been more or less able to finance its reconstruction without 
any major help from the IMF and WB and it has been able to do so through its own resources, 
relying mainly on incomes and benefits emerging from oil and diamond exports (Alfredo, 
2010, 10). IMF and WB started their talks with Angola in 1999 and the position of those 
organizations has distinctly reformed over the years. IMF has frequently requested Angola to 
achieve official, essential and political reforms, nevertheless all those propositions were 
refused until the breakthrough year of 2002 (Alfredo, 2010, 10). In 2002 the oil revenues 
were extremely low compared to the current situation in Angola; as a result Angola asked the 
IMF and WB for help and in return granted them access to their economic and political 
system proposals. Angola anticipated the Fund’s formation of a set of reasonably 
governmental recommendations followed by provision of a de facto non-conditional loan 
(Alfredo, 2010, 10). Instead, only small grants from International Development Agency 
(IDA) were distributed for special social project. IMF operating its systematic schedule 
finished the Article IV consultations with Angola in which the IMF did not define the 
economic program competent to undergo the observance of the Fund, primarily because of 
poor Angola’s statistical pool. Moreover, IMF stated several obstacles which would hinder 
future financial assistance and that there were more serious uncertainties concerned with 
Angola’s political performance. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The manner in which we judge ‘success’ in the global economic system has been shaped by 
what John Williamson in 1989 called the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2004: 1-2). 
The ten original Washington Consensus principles were clearly illustrated within this chapter 
and have been imposed on a number of African countries including Angola. As an outcome 
these principles impacted most African countries’ economies negatively for a number of 
reasons, which includes a lack of understanding by the Western states and a lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of African states. The outcome in a number of countries that applied 
the Washington Consensus principles included governmental changes, dismissals, salary 
reductions and departmental reforms. In Sub‐Saharan Africa governments moved with less 
belief and swiftness. Sub‐Saharan African countries failed to reach most of their development 
objectives, despite significant policy reform, improvements in the political and external 
environments and continued foreign aid. The successes of Washington Consensus were few, 
with Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique being the most commonly cited instances and have 
remained fragile for more than a decade later  (Godfrey, 2011, 8).  
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 In contrast to the rest of Africa, Angola’s elites never permitted the IMF to administer 
economic policy directly. Yet by 2002 they had nonetheless contained key tenets of the 
Washington Consensus: liberalization of external flows, strictness for public services and 
privatization of public properties. While the USA may be the biggest partner to Angola in 
terms of aid, Angola’s biggest trading partner is now China. China is generally interested in 
Angola for their oil, however they are also involved in an important number of infrastructure 
and development projects in the country, this point will be sufficiently discussed on the next 
chapter. Even after billions of dollars and years spent on aid and development projects 
Angola remains as one of the poorest nations in the world. Perhaps the US should have paid 
more attention to turning Angola into a sustainable business partner rather than simply 
throwing money at them. Although Angola is now richer than it had been before, the prospect 
of true development remains weak. Poor public organizations, corruption, and dependency 
are among the difficulties that continue to hinder Angola from achieving development 
objectives. 
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CHAPTER 4: CHINA-ANGOLA ASSESSMENT (BEIJING CONSENSUS) 
China’s approach to Africa, popularly referred to as the Beijing Consensus, may have serious 
implications to the continent’s development paradigm. Many African leaders view the 
emerging South–South relations as a historic opportunity to escape their neo-colonial ties 
with the West. In China 400 million people were elevated out of poverty in two decades, 
without externally enforced structural adjustment programmes and has in that sense, bolstered 
African countries’ optimism that they too can devise their own development path and that the 
Western model is not that holy (Kuan, 2013, 4). By offering a ‘different’ approach to 
development, China styles itself as leader of the global South and champion of a reformist 
international order. All recent studies show that China’s contribution in Africa provides 
African countries an alternative from the Washington Consensus. Although China is an 
outspoken supporter of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), its support for the AU 
and the NEPAD has so far demonstrated to be a little more than rhetoric (Kuan, 2013, 5). 
Also, its aid is practically mutual and thus outside the existing manner of international 
development assistance (Kuan, 2013, 5).   
Chinese attention in Africa and other regions is driven to a large extent by its rising needs for 
raw materials and energy. Oil imported from Africa sums to a third of the total Chinese oil 
imports, a ratio that continues to rise (Broadman, 2008, 95). In fact 50% of the FDI from 
China goes to countries with large oil reserves such as Nigeria and Sudan, while also 
extending to countries like Angola, Congo, Chad and Equatorial Guinea (Broadman, 2008, 
95). For example, in the case of Angola, which lately overtook Saudi Arabia as the chief 
supplier of oil for China, the PRC did not hesitate to offer a 2 billion dollar credit at a very 
low interest rate and without any kind of conditionality (Broadman, 2008, 96). The deal was 
acknowledged by the Angolan government, permitting it to escape from the good governance 
conditionality’s set by the IMF for a similar loan. If the previous decade is of any sign, China 
will continue to pursue greater rewards in Angola’s oil sector and both countries appear to 
favour the oil arrangement at present. The West’s presence in Angola through the use of 
Washington Consensus makes the case of Angola interesting as it displays various ways in 
which Angola can achieve its development objectives. From Angola’s side, analysts admit 
that the Angolan government also desires to expand both its exports and its trade partners. A 
2007 Chatham House paper found that the Angolan bureaucrats interviewed desired to avoid 
overdependence on China as an economic partner (Broadman, 2008, 97). 
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4.1 What is meant by Beijing Consensus? 
 The incredible economic growth that occurred in the PRC over the last few decades has 
attracted the attention of researchers and policy-makers all over the world. Given the PRC’s 
economic growth and development plans that differ from those of the IMF and the WB, some 
authors are of the view that a new consensus, a Beijing Consensus, might be emerging and 
could possibly replace the so-called Washington Consensus. The existence of a new model of 
development inspired by the PRC has been subject to enthusiastic debates among experts, 
practitioners and academics for the last few years. While some of them consider the Beijing 
Consensus a suitable replacement of the Washington Consensus, others question the viability 
of the Chinese model, its prospect of success, and the very existence of such an alternative 
model. “China is writing its own book now. The book represents a fusion of Chinese thinking 
with lessons learned from the failure of globalisation culture in other places. The rest of the 
world has begun to study this book.” (Ramo, 2004: 5). For other developing nations, 
replicating even a piece of China’s success would be successful indeed. Where the 
Washington Consensus recommends the same strict and homogeneous reforms to nearly all 
developing countries, the Beijing Consensus recognizes the need for a unique approach based 
on each nation’s unique challenges (Ramo, 2004: 5). 
 The Beijing Consensus lays down a new approach to development based on China’s model 
for economic growth and political principles of non-interference and self-determination. The 
term was introduced in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, who contended that “China is marking 
a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to 
develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows 
them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with 
a single massively powerful center of gravity” (Niccolo, 2011, 46). The Beijing Consensus, 
which first achieved its platform in 2004 when Joshua Cooper Ramo published his paper 
“The Beijing Consensus” through the United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy Centre, is based 
upon three overarching ideals of Chinese development, which in turn propose how to arrange 
the place of a developing country in the world (Ramo, 2004: 11). These three ideas are 
summarized below:   
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I: Innovation 
In order to overtake the “friction losses of reform,” governments must keenly innovate in 
order to address the trials presented by the fluctuating economic and social environment 
(Ramo, 2004: 12). Another author expresses this as a commitment to “constant tinkering and 
constant change, and recognition that different strategies are appropriate for different 
situations” (Ramo, 2004: 12). This feature of the Beijing Consensus is derived from the 
importance that China has positioned on innovation in its own development since 1979. In 
particular, China has preserved a strong focus on establishing effective policies, which solve 
problems that are actually important to its people. In order to realise this goal, it has been 
vital for China to actually attain an understanding of what people want: Ogden writes, “The 
Chinese government itself is known to carry out surveys of public opinion precisely to find 
out public attitude toward the government,” and consequently to keenly measure the 
influence and popularity of its policies (Ogden, 2002: 100-101). The fact that the Chinese 
government relies heavily on surveys and questioning, reproduces a dedication to “constant 
tinkering” vis-à-vis ground-breaking policymaking. Some of the results have been debated to 
outside observers (Ogden, 2002: 100-101). For instance, the one child policy, applied to slow 
population growth however within China; such policies have been highly successful. In the 
case of the one child policy, the policy has allowed China to achieve goals of significant 
prominence to its population, such as economic growth and stability. Despite appearing 
absurd and morally questionable to the outside world, this policy is important and works for 
China as emphasised by their GDP.     
II: Pursuit of Dynamic Goals/Rejection of Per Capita GDP 
In principle, the next big idea of the Beijing Consensus is refusal of GDP per capita as the 
element of development (Leonard, 2006, Not Available). This ideal assists in part as a refusal 
of Western policies, which are known to weigh these statistics heavily. Instead, the Beijing 
Consensus proposes an increased attention on measures such as quality of life and individual 
justice, areas that China has intensely focused its attention on (Ramo, 2004: 12). 
Qualitatively, the most perfect measure of quality of life is the UN Development Program’s 
(UNDP) and Human Development Index (HDI): These standards offer an alternative to the 
view of development associated entirely with economic growth and assist us to understand 
that poverty is actually the lack of basic skills rather than merely lowness of incomes (Ogden, 
2002: 367). Scrutinising development in this manner therefore emphasize the realization of 
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substantive results and discredits, for example, situations where income growth benefits only 
a trifling portion of the population. The difference between measurements of HDI and GDP 
can also be important. For example, according to the UNDP’s 2007 data (published in 2009) 
China was ranked 102 out of 182 countries in terms of per-capita GDP, while it was ranked 
56th in measurements of adult literacy, 72 considering life expectancy, and 92 according to 
HDI value (UNDP) (Ogden, 2002: 367-368). Seeing GDP as the single most important factor 
would consequently underestimate China’s other fundamental success.  
In this sense, China’s governing leaders have often emphasized the need to concurrently 
follow multiple goals: “China’s development strategy, according to Premier Wen Jiabao, 
includes placing people first and promoting improvement and innovation in accordance with 
the ‘five-stabilities’: balancing urban and rural development, balancing development among 
regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing development between man 
and nature and balancing domestic development with opening wider to the outside world 
(Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2006: 5). In contrast, the idea of pursuing stable development is 
hardly stated in the outline of Western priorities. The Beijing Consensus recognizes that an 
increasing GDP, left without other goals and serious strategies for realising them, will not 
solve problems of everyday relevance to the population.  
III. Self-Determination 
Finally, the third point of the Beijing Consensus stresses the necessity for developing 
countries to actively seek independence from outside pressure, as it is imposed by 
“hegemonic powers” such as the United States (Ramo, 2004: 12). Ultimately, this supreme 
can be seen both over the lens of China’s traditional dislike to foreign invasion, and by 
considering the fact that China has denied to give in to outside pressure and as an alternative 
pursued its own priorities (Ramo, 2004: 12). Gresh describes this characteristic of the Beijing 
Consensus as “valuing independence and self-determination and refusing to let other 
(western) powers enforce their will,” stressing the idea that “Countries can plan their own 
development without having to admit the unfavourable terms of the Washington Consensus” 
(Gresh, 2008, N-A). Indeed, it is easy to see why the Chinese model has been met with a 
strong interest in other developing nations. Particularly in Africa, where western countries 
have an extensive history of incursion and exploitation the idea of self-determination being 
important to development, as China proposes, is highly appealing. This is evident in China’s 
increasing role in the region: Princeton Lyman, for the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote, 
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China’s investments are good-looking to Africans since they come with no conditionality 
related to governance, fiscal probity or other worries  (Lyman, 2005, N-A). China, in other 
words, does not pursue to enforce its own main concern on partner countries, for good or ill. 
Regardless of whether the U.S. and other Western nations agree with the ideology of self-
determination, it is a key component of the Beijing Consensus that further underscores the 
alternative value of the Beijing Consensus in relation to the Washington Consensus (Lyman, 
2005, N-A).    
4.2 From Washington to Beijing consensus, a new road towards development of Angola 
When the United States appeared as the winning nation in the end of the Cold War the 
“Washington Consensus” turned out to be the only durable trustworthy socio-political model. 
The financial disaster in 2008, China’s economic success and Africa’s dependence on China, 
all led to the Washington Consensus losing its standing. The disaster of the Washington 
Consensus in terms of aiding Africa with structural adjustment has been so dramatic that 
some critics argued that the strategies enforced on African countries were never envisioned to 
approve development. On the contrary, they declare that the goal of the Washington 
Consensus was to preserve African countries economically weak (Ann, 2002, 1). This point is 
justified by the circumstance that most industrialized countries in the world have actually 
developed under conditions conflicting to those imposed by the Washington Consensus. 
Under the Washington Consensus, African countries have been required to cut back or give 
up the very requirements which helped rich countries to prosper and grow in the past. 
Washington Consensus policies focused a lot on the economic aspects of development 
leaving African countries ever so dependent on loans offered by the IMF and the WB (Ann, 
2002, 1). This serves as one of the most important reason for China’s increasing African 
engagement which threatens to challenge the Washington Consensus.  
The case of Beijing Consensus is so exclusive that there have been fascinating discussions on 
it. Just a few decades ago when the Washington Consensus was dominant, no one cared about 
the China’s mode of development. Some social experts and economists back then even 
predicted the downfall of the communist regime in a near future. As of lately, emphases have 
been drawn to the Beijing Consensus. The Beijing Consensus encompasses many 
philosophies that are not about economics (Shaun, 2013, 3). They are about politics, quality 
of life and the international balance of power (Shaun, 2013, 3). Beijing is using tied aid both 
to improve the business opportunities for Chinese companies in Africa and to cover the way 
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for vast investment projects (Shaun, 2013, 3). It is without surprise that China is 
concentrating its investment and aid strategies on countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, in 
which the MNCs are barely present, either because they have not yet ventured into these 
markets or because they have withdrawn owing to the international sanctions regime.  All in 
all, Chinese companies are better ready to deal with the detailed political risks found in many 
unstable African states than many Western firms considers as Rogue states and that gives 
them a comparative advantage. With the above given differences between the two 
consensuses,  one can strongly argue that with the Beijing Consensus active in Africa, 
African states stand better chances for development as compared to the earlier times of the 
Washington Consensus. 
4.3 Evaluate the empirical role played by China through the use of Beijing Consensus 
During the 2000s, China continued supplying Luanda with loans. In 2005 when Vice Premier 
Zeng Peiyan visited Angola, Beijing offered a $6.3 million interest free loan and another $1 
billion loan in March 2006 (Loro, 2006, 494). In June 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao provided 
another $2 billion loan during his visit to Luanda (Loro, 2006, 494). According to Angola’s 
Deputy Minister of Finance, China’s credit to Angola accounts for 58% of the total credit 
Angola obtained after 2002 (Loro, 2006, 495). The Chinese ambassador to Angola assessed 
that three Chinese state banks, the Exim Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank, and the 
China Development Bank, have extended almost $15 billion in credit to Angola (Loro, 2006, 
494-495). Within that same year, China provided a $100 million credit line for upgrading 
health sector facilities in Huambo Province (Loro, 2006, 495). Above and beyond funding 
reconstruction efforts, China has also funded tasks such as the construction of stadiums for 
the 2010 African Cup of Nations. China has written off about $10 million in Angolan debt, 
yet the country still owes almost $18 billion (Loro, 2006, 493). In addition, China has 
provided some humanitarian aid, such as a $1 million donation of agricultural goods to 
Malanje Province (Loro, 2006, 493). According to the Chinese ambassador to Angola, there 
are approximately 50 state-owned firms and 400 private companies working in Angola with 
about 70,000 Chinese workers (Loro, 2006, 493). In a country where the majority of the 
population lives in extreme poverty, these varieties of stadium projects seem extreme. There 
are projects and buildings that are more needed in Angola than this stadium. Many Chinese 
projects weaken the development of local industry in Angola. Angolan scholar Pinto de 
Andrade wrote in 2007 that Chinese aid has had slight impact on Angolan job creation and 
there has been slight technology transfer from Beijing to Luanda (Kiala, 2010, 23).  
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4.4 China-Angola Cooperation   
It was not obvious that China would become a major economic partner for Angola when its 
civil war ended. For an extensive period during Angola’s civil war, China supported the 
FNLA and UNITA, the two groups that ultimately lost.  In 1983 China opened diplomatic 
relations with the Angolan government (MPLA) and in 1988 they created a Joint Economic 
and Trade Commission (JETC) (Roselyn, 2013, 13). However, it took a period exceeding 10 
years before the two countries would actively engage in any passable relations for Angola 
(Roselyn, 2013, 13). After almost 30 years of civil war, Angola was devastated and in need of 
major development (Roselyn, 2013, 13). Half a million people had been killed during the 
decades of violence and a million displaced. Roads were in disorder, over 300 bridges had 
been demolished and fields were full of landmines (Roselyn, 2013, 13). Luanda turned to 
international organizations for assistance and was met with conditions for political 
transparency and reform. Groups such as the IMF and the Paris Club required that the country 
undergo significant transformation in exchange for aid. From 1995-2004, Angola agreed to 
four IMF programs, but was unsuccessful to complete any of them. Although China was a 
member of the IMF at this time, its voting share was about 2% of total votes, giving it little 
power to influence decisions (Roselyn, 2013, 13).  
 In 1998 President Dos Santo visited China and in 1999 their command finally met for the 
first time (Roselyn, 2013, 14). From that point forward, it was clear that Angola was 
interested in receiving China’s assistance in rebuilding the country’s infrastructure. As a 
product-based economy merging from 27 years of conflict, before China’s dominant role 
Angola was in desperate need of new partners and a new source of FDI (Roselyn, 2013, 14). 
For the Angolan government, this new assistance brings important advantages to the country: 
serving to support economic growth. China offers a new model of assistance and in contrasts 
with the Western form of assistance based on conditionality’s. The existing phase of Chinese 
engagement with Angola began at a unique moment for both countries. Angola needed 
development assistance and had oil just at the time when China realized it needed oil and 
could provide development assistance in return. Although not easily measured, Chinese 
investments have contributed to the much needed combat against poverty in Angola. The 
building and reintegration of electrical and hydro-electrical infrastructure by the Chinese has 
expanded electricity access to over 60,000 new clients, the restoration of roads, bridges, and 
rail networks provides access to parts of the country that had been detached by the war and 
eases commercial activities (Roselyn, 2013, 13).  
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Both the West and China spoil Angola with non-transparent oil-backed loans. While the 
Chinese loans are often cheaper as compared to the Western loans, Beijing commands more 
strictly to Luanda what can be done with the money. Chinese agreements from the Exim 
Bank require that 70% of projects be awarded to Chinese firms and 50% of the procurement 
resources must come from China (Malcolm, 2009, 84). For Angola, China stands as an 
appropriate source of financial aid in the form of loans and in 2004 China’s Exim Bank 
provided an oil-backed $2 billion loan to the Angolan government (Malcolm, 2009, 85). The 
loan was to be paid back over a period of 12 years. The loan was then doubled in 2006. The 
interest rate was only London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 1.5%, unlike the 
premium of 2.5% plus LIBOR from other loans (Malcolm, 2009, 85). This loan was the 
consequence of Angola’s historical negative relationship with international financial 
institutions such as the IMF. President dos Santos in 2006 declared, “We appreciate the 
cooperation…and the efforts our two countries are making to rehabilitate basic facilities 
destroyed during the war in Angola” (Campos, 2009, 31). The conditions of these loans are 
only based on payment procedures, such as being repaid through an allocation of 10,000 
barrels of oil per day (Campos, 2009, 31). These Chinese loans differ from Western loans for 
their interest rate and longer payment timeframe. 
Angola has numerous financial associates as many foreign countries and banks have invested 
in Angola and provided loans. Within months of China’s $2 billion loan, a group of Western 
Banks such as Standard Chartered, Barclays, and the Royal Bank of Scotland settled an oil-
backed loan of $2.35 billion for the state-owned oil company (Campos, 2009, 32). This 
unique Western loan did not come with conditions and attachments and thus did not attempt 
to improve Angola’s governance. The loan did not require transparency in public accounting 
and it is still unclear as to what the money was used for. Repayments were due over a period 
of five years and like the Chinese loans, they were guaranteed future oil production. While 
Angola may have numerous aid partners, Angola does not rank at the top of the list for 
economic investment. The commodity-backed infrastructure loans are helping develop 
Angola, but not the Angolan working class. To cite the well-known proverb, the Chinese are 
providing fish for the Angolans, but are not teaching them how to fish. However, there is no 
condition, or possibly even expectation, that foreign countries should develop the countries in 
which they are investing. The China-Angola association has grown strong over the past 
decades in part due to the recurrent contact between the leaders of the two nations. Oil 
between the China-Angola relations plays a vital role as China became a net oil importer in 
31 
 
1993 and securing energy resources became one of Beijing’s top priorities (Roselyn, 2013, 
14). China’s manifestation in Angola grants a fascinating case study of China’s oil 
relationships with African nations and there is a complex interplay of benefits and challenges. 
Choosing Angola as a case was crucial in discussing the growing China-Africa relation given 
the fact that the Sino-Angolan oil relationship will likely remain significant and sustained for 
the coming decades. Figure 4.1 demonstrates just how much oil Beijing will need from 
Angola in the coming decades.  
Figure 4.1: China’s Oil Demand and Angola’s Supply, 1980-2030 
 
 
 
In Angola, China’s presence remains modest as compared to that of the West through the 
Washington Consensus. China’s loans for oil deals with Angola represent China’s Foreign 
Policy objectives of becoming a Global Economic power and might possibly lead to many 
future ramifications for Angola. China’s loans are an attractive alternative to those from 
international institutions that have conditions involved intended at promoting the Angola’s 
standard of living and controversially aimed at helping Angola to achieve its development 
objectives. One shared criticism is that China’s economic policy is resource single-minded 
and goal oriented; its China’s non-interference approach that turns to challenge Western 
countries’ hopes for democratic progress in Angola.  
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Figure 4.2: China’s Imports of African Oil by Country 
 
 
 The majority of Chinese trade with Angola is dedicated on oil. As President Dos Santos 
stated in 2007, “China needs natural resources and Angola needs development” (South 
African Press Association).  Figure 4.2 shows just how Beijing’s oil-concentrated purchases 
were from 1995-2005, 45% of Angola’s oil goes to China and makes up 15% of China’s total 
oil imports and 99% of Angolan exports to China are oil (Corkin, 2008, 119). In 2008 Angola 
was China’s main trading partner in Africa and it briefly exceeded Saudi Arabia as the top 
supplier of oil to China (Corkin, 2008, 119). Figure 4.2 shows just how much China depends 
on Angola for its oil. One specialist labelled the relationship as one that is characterized by 
China’s growing thirst for oil and China’s goal of becoming the next Global economic power. 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discussed and analyzed China’s influence in Angola using the Beijing 
Consensus. It is clear that Angola fits into the pattern of a traditional resource-based 
argument of the Chinese influence in Africa. China will do or ignore anything in its quest for 
oil. This chapter brings about  realization that it is entirely up to African governments to 
make whatever internal changes necessary to ensure development and to make an external 
decision as to which consensus (if either) would best serve African interests. The problem 
arises when African governments are unable to govern effectively or legitimately. China’s 
lack of conditions could easily encourage the realization of Angola’s development objectives. 
However, “whether the no political strings attached policy will be beneficial or not is left in 
the hands of the Angolan governments.   
Angolan politics, or governance, is of very poor standards and lacks the institutions to ensure 
the equal distribution of oil wealth. For example, Human Rights Watch and other 
organizations have called on Angola to join international groups such as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (Roselyn, 2013, 14). Neither Western nor China is 
persistent for transparency or reform. As much as the blame is shared, there are some features 
of Chinese investments that are of contrast from Western aid. Despite Beijing’s rhetoric that 
its aid is unlike the Western aid, Chinese funds are tied economically versus the West’s 
political ties. Chinese aid and investment in Angola obliges that Angolans use Chinese 
materials and contractors, which does not fully contribute to Angolan development. China 
solely aims at attaining as much oil as possible from Luanda. While Western nations are 
correspondingly interested in energy, they also experiment in other industries, which helps 
expand industries in Angola.  
The Chinese also have a long and special relationship with President Dos Santos. They have 
supported him for about thirty years and could utilise their long standing relationship with 
him to enact changes. Although China is Angola’s most significant oil export market and 
trade partner, this prestige has not brought particular power or control to influence Angolan 
policy. Due to the fact that oil is an important commodity, if China stopped buying oil in an 
effort to inspire better governance (an unlikely move for Beijing), its action would likely 
have little influence as the European Union, the United States, India and other nations would 
most likely to step in to purchase more oil. The Chinese have made it apparent that political 
reform and equality are not a prerequisite to receiving aid from Beijing.  
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China has not taken benefit of its long standing relationship with Dos Santos or its decades of 
participation in the country to pressure Angola to develop. As it stands the Chinese model is 
an attractive substitute for those authoritarian leaders who may want to advance the growth 
and development rates of their countries without placing their regimes at risk, making 
economic development the main concern over political reform. This leads to an important 
question: is the Beijing Consensus really useful as a development model for Angola as 
compared to the Washington Consensus?  This question will be sufficiently answered shortly 
within the paper.     
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CHAPTER 5: THE PERFORMANCE UNDER THE CONSENSUSES 
As it stands most African Countries have continued to apply the principles of both 
consensuses in their economic policies, however their road to development remains unclear 
with very little consideration for their growth potentials. Although, the Washington 
Consensus could be said to have better macroeconomic strength in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), 
it had not simplified the solution to development in Africa and developing countries in 
general. This comment was supported by Woo (2004), who interpreted that although 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand applied the Washington Consensus type of policies to counter 
the Asian financial crisis, they suffered deeper output losses for a longer period than 
Malaysia, which adopted capital controls instead (Wing, 2004, 5). The one‐size‐fits‐all 
approach of the Washington Consensus did not take into account the degrees of the individual 
African states telling poor countries in Africa that they have to set their visions on the best 
practice institutions of the U.S.A or Sweden is like telling them that the only way to develop 
is to become developed (Wing, 2004, 5). By treating Africa as one unified component, 
blessed with the same benefits enjoyed by Western states, protagonists of the Washington 
Consensus failed to understand that development in Africa required more than just tax 
reform. 
Currently in doubt, is also the ability of the Beijing Consensus to ensure sustainable 
development in Angola. Williamson (2012) retains that the Beijing Consensus could best be 
labelled as protecting China’s self-interest rather than a sincere concern for Africa’s 
developmental needs (Williamson, 2004: 1-2). For example, Chinese loans to Angola were 
closely interconnected to trade and investments in Chinese commodities. In 2004, the 
Chinese government granted Angola long term non-concessional loan of US$2 billion on the 
condition that 70 per cent of the total loan contracts would be awarded to Chinese companies 
(Corkin, 2008, 118). The loan was also conditioned on the fact that China imports 10,000 
barrels of crude oil per day from Angola throughout the loan repayment contract (Corkin, 
2008, 118). The terms of the loan clearly indicated that it was not designed to have a 
meaningful impact on the citizens and poverty alleviation through domestic job creation. To 
support the notion that the Beijing consensus is more of a self-interest approach to 
investments, Lammers (2007) held that, the Chinese development assistance and soft loans to 
Africa had given China the opportunity to explore Africa’s oil-fields as experienced in 
Angola and Sudan (Corkin, 2008, 119).   
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5.1 Criticisms of the Western approach (Washington Consensus) towards Angola’s 
development goals  
Williamson the man who came up with the term has come to the following concession: The 
Washington Consensus has been understood to mean bashing the state, a new imperialism 
and the creation of a laissez-faire global economy, that the only thing that matters is the 
growth of GDP (Williamson, 2004, 6).  The tragedy of the Washington Consensus’ approach 
to aiding Africa with structural adjustment has been so intense that some critics argued that 
the policies imposed on African countries were never intended to approve development 
(Mares, 2001, 31). On the contrary, they assert that the objective of the Washington 
Consensus was to keep African countries economically weak (Mares, 2001, p: 31). This point 
is justified by the fact that most industrialized countries in the world have actually developed 
under circumstances different to those enforced by the Washington Consensus (Mares, 2001, 
31-32). Under the Washington Consensus, African states have been required to cut back or 
abandon the very same requirements which helped developed countries to prosper in their 
development path (Mares, 2001, 32). The Washington Consensus policies focused a lot on 
the economic features of development driving African countries such as Angola to be more 
reliant on loans offered by the IMF and the WB. This serves as one of the adequate reasons 
for China’s increasing African commitment which threatens to encounter the Washington 
Consensus.  
5.2 Criticisms of the Chinese approach (Beijing Consensus) towards Angola’s 
development goals  
United States and Western critics strongly argue that the Chinese engagement in Africa is 
mainly a form of crude mercantilism and political interventionism that directly threatens U.S 
interest and calls for confrontation, condemnation and containment (Alden, 2008, 175). The 
Western countries strongly claim that China is guilty of backing corrupt political elites in 
‘rogue states’ in exchange for exploitation rights or other forms of access to raw materials 
(Alden, 2008, 175).  This undermines the initiatives Western countries have undertaken 
through the use of conditional aid as means of fighting corruption and improving standards of 
governance in such states. Critics have also paid devotion to China’s Foreign Policy pillar of 
non-interference to sovereignty of states; this pillar is a problem because it contrasts strongly 
with the West’s conditionality approach (Power, 2012, 131). Beijing consensus has 
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increasingly claimed that non-interference is a essential condition for building a harmonious 
world and this perspective has provided the foundation of Chinese foreign policy since the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formulated in the 1950s (Power, 2012, 131). 
China’s engagement in the African continent has caused conflict between itself and the 
traditional donor countries. Simply because the Western countries are losing some of their 
influence in those African countries in which China has become a significant player. 
Bureaucrats of the G8 have criticised China for its approach in Africa, on the grounds that 
China weakens the G8s determinations to increase the effectiveness of foreign aid (OECD, 
2011, 114). They continue to argue that China is backing up corrupt elites and it also weakens 
Western efforts to improve transparency and values of governance (Alden, 2008, 175-176). 
Critics have further argued that China offers aid and military equipment to African countries 
irrespective of their style or equality of governance and of their human rights records (Alden, 
2008, 176).  The engagement of the Chinese provides a platform where certain African 
governments may reject demands made by the IMF and the WB which entails that they 
should qualify for aid by improving transparency, implementing anti-corruption strategies 
and making progress towards democratisation. The Western countries also express doubts 
about China’s delivery of military equipment to rogue regimes and to both parties in a single 
war (Alden, 2008, 176).  
Critics also strongly argue that China is ignoring corruption and failing to support better-
quality social and environmental standards in Africa (Alden, 2008, p: 176). In the case of 
Angola the Chinese require that 70% of projects be given to Chinese firms which mean that 
the majority of the funds are going to Chinese firms (OECD, 2011, 114). In an effort to 
advance Chinese companies, projects financed by the Chinese Exim bank must have at least 
50% of the procurement materials from China. While many goods are often cheaper in China, 
the Angolans are often getting a road, or stadium and nothing else, no market development or 
local business growth. In addition Chinese aid has had little influence on Angolan job 
creation and there has been minimal technology transfer from Beijing to Luanda (OECD, 
2011, 114). The Beijing Consensus also depends on on the idea that China’s path to 
development is unrepeatable by any other nation. This is the opposite of the universal 
prescriptions provided by the Washington Consensus and the Chinese leaders seem reluctant 
to recognize the existence of any Chinese model which other states might copy. One of the 
main trademarks of the Beijing Consensus is that it does not command set policy points to 
those who may seek to use it as a model.   
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5.3 Survey  
The survey was conducted through the use of University of Witwatersrand Postgraduate 
students from a wide range of disciplinary fields. The aim of the survey is to highlight 
scholar’s perception to the growing China-Angola relationship.   
China’s interest in Angola 
1. Is it in China’s interest to help Angola/Africa to develop? 
Yes    ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ 
No ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  
 (Provide a tick as an answer-one tick per person) 
This question produced different views from the participants as they offered different 
observations. However one scholar argued that he is not of the opinion that China has any 
specific interest in aiding Africa to develop. For any government to engage with a country 
they have to be realistic and serve their national interest. No country can approach African 
countries and say they have too much money to spend hence they would want to help them 
develop. When one evaluates the Sino-African relation on the basis of China having to 
develop Africa they must firstly differentiate the China’s notion of relation with Africa that I 
have a strategy to help you and I have a strategy to do business with you which will help you.  
I am just doing business with you because I know you need me so you can use me to develop, 
however I am also rationale I want to diversify my investment, I want to make my state own 
enterprise, be more competitive globally  and that is a business concept.  
Another scholar argued that: I strongly hold that the Chinese have no substantial interest in 
aiding Angola to develop. This is based on the nature of the relationship that has been 
established between the two countries; which I would describe as merely a business 
transaction, Angola gives oil in return of whatever aid China lays on the deck each time. This 
aid, truly speaking provides very little for the Angolan population considering the fact that a 
large amount of the development activities are headed by the Chinese companies currently 
present in Angola and ultimately leaving many Angolans citizens without much.  It is in the 
above mentioned arguments that one can note that Africans are the ones to develop 
themselves. Africa’s development is in the hands of African leaders; no international actor 
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will come and provide development for Africa only Africans themselves. China wants to buy; 
Africa has energy and other resources to sell. If African governments could respond in a way 
that can encourage development then China might provide an opportunity for Africa which 
Europe and America have failed to deliver (Friedman, 2008, 2). As a result of intensified 
trade links with China, Africa has enjoyed higher growth rates; better terms of trade, 
increased export volumes, higher public revenues (Friedman, 2008, 2). China is indeed doing 
more to promote and help African development in the process of helping itself than any other 
Western country. A report by the World Bank concluded that China’s investments ease 
Africa’s poverty (Williamson, 2004: 3). Africans should stop having this idea that only the 
developed countries can develop Africa, they should learn from the likes of India, Japan, 
china and many other countries who have started from nothing and became something. 
The Extent of Perceived Sino-Angola relationship 
2. What do you think of the growing China-Angola relationship towards Angola’s 
development objectives as compared to earlier Western attempts through the Washington 
Consensus? 
Good       ✓     
Bad   ✓     ✓    
Not much different ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
(Provide a tick as an answer-one tick per person 
The first question was to evaluate scholar’s perception towards the growing China-Angola 
relation. As shown from the answers above, a number of scholars believe that China’s 
interests in Africa is not much different from those of the neo-liberal Western powers as it is 
meant to serve China’s interest. It is by no doubt that China’s principal interest in the 
continent is access to natural resources. But Africa also provides new markets for China’s 
growing economy indicated by the Chinese consumer goods that are flooding African 
markets.  
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Perception to the China-Angola relation: Win-Win partnership or new imperialism 
3. Do you think the China-Angola relation is on basis of a win-win association or it is new 
imperialism? 
Win-Win partnership      ✓  ✓ ✓  
Neo- imperialism    ✓      ✓ 
Neither  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓    
(Provide a tick as an answer-one tick per person) 
Participants were asked about their perception on the growing China-Angola relation. In 
addition to the above offered answers one scholar argued that China is making it clear that its 
principal interest in Angola is access to Angola’s oil. China is in Angola with attempts to 
fulfil its Foreign Policy objective and as we all know that there is no countries Foreign Policy 
objective aimed at developing another country. What most critics should take into 
consideration with regard to China is that post-1949 China was devastated by war and levels 
of ‘development’ in certain African states were above that of China however today China 
reflects an inspiring, if highly mixed, demonstration of a developing yet already significantly 
advanced economy. 
Another scholar argued stating: from what I have observed from most developed countries I 
am of the opinion that before any country can prosper economically it has to have a fairly 
disciplined government towards development objectives. These may or could bring about a 
country in harmony and decrease chances of corruption. China’s ignorance of these factors 
promotes unfair practices in governments and brings forth the idea of China being a Neo-
imperialist as it is dominating Africans countries through the use of economic exchange and 
ignoring the important aspects of achieving development.  
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China’s involvement in Africa: 
4. Is China hampering African countries’ development strategies by its extraction of raw 
materials, ignorance of corruption and the provision of aid and military equipment to 
these countries regardless of their quality of governance and of their human rights 
records? 
Yes  ✓  ✓     ✓  
No ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
(Provide a tick as an answer-one tick per person) 
The answer to the above asked question stands as an example indicating that not all partakers 
believe that China is hampering African countries development strategies. One scholar 
further elaborated by arguing that China’s engagement with African leaders is on basis of 
choices. China offers African countries choices whether they should have any cooperation 
with China through trade, financial means and other means just to mention few. Hence, China 
does not enforce any ideas and strategies in its relation; it is only driven by its thirst for raw 
materials and capital accumulation in Africa in order to fulfil its national interests. So what 
African countries do with their aid and the level of development is not in China’s interest. 
 As the Chinese people often say with regards to their engagement with Africa that they can 
give you rice but they will not cook it for you. Without African leaders political will to 
development, the disadvantaged African citizens will not see their lives bettered by Chinese’ 
presence in Africa (Friedman, 2008, p: 2). It is clear that Africans are the ones to develop 
themselves and the harm caused by China and other global powers in the exploitation of 
resources should not be seen as a hampering development element but should be perceived as 
a call for Africans to stand up and develop themselves from the opportunities offered. 
Development in Africa is possible given the fact that Africa is rich in natural resources. 
However the road to development also comes with challenges that includes dealing with 
corrupt regimes, conflicted areas, inadequate state leaders and other factors just to mention 
few, however frequent support from the international actors such as China; Africa can deal 
effectively with its challenges  and achieve development. 
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Government Handling of Angola’s development objectives  
5. How well or badly would you say the government is handling Angola’s development 
objectives? 
Very Well           
Badly  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
(Provide a tick as an answer-one tick per person) 
Generally the people detect no satisfactory measures in the government's alleged efforts to 
achieving development objectives. The high hopes of the transition era have largely been 
ruined, as the practice of corruption both routine and grand remains “business as usual” in 
Angola. As it turns out the government measures of achieving development are not 
sufficiently effective as the country still faces issues such as not making satisfactory progress 
in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), corruption as one of the key 
aspects that hinders development and state bureaucracy to mention few. Angola has the 
potential to lay down the rules and significantly benefit from its relationship with China. 
Angola may need China for different reasons, but China needs Angola just as much.  
The oil provided by Angola for the Chinese is essential in the Chinese manufacturing 
industry, which brings in a large portion of their yearly income. Angola can therefore use this 
to their advantage and demand more, lay down few conditions and ultimately do what is best 
for their people; this includes the eradication of foreign companies (Chinese) within Angola 
and insisting that more than half the population of companies should be owned by the 
Angolan population. This is just one of many ways the Angolan government can improve the 
Angolan development objectives. It is also important for one to note that Angolan 
governments need to find measures that will help the country to achieve development instead 
of relying on foreign aid. In a bid to improve Angola’s reputation and ensure an environment 
conducive to rapid economic and political change, Angolan government must be prepared to 
look inward at tackling the problems that have been preventing the country from reaching 
development for such a long time.  
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5.4 China as a model of development for Angola 
Politically as well as economically, China has provided a substitute development model for 
many African states in the eyes of many of their leaders (Sujian and Baogang, 2010, 141). 
According to Naidu and Davies, China poses an elevating substitute to the traditional 
engagement models of the West (Taylor, 2007, 23). African governments see China’s pledge 
as a point of withdrawal from Western neo-colonialism and political conditions under the 
Washington Consensus (Taylor, 2009, p: 23).Concurs one Nigerian analyst, argued that 
China is the living proof of “successful” alternatives to Western political and economic 
models (Taylor, 2009, 23). China indeed signifies the hope that another world is possible, in 
which development comes before the freedom to vote. Before one can criticize China, it is of 
importance to note that Europeans and Americans cannot do what Chinese are doing. Coming 
from richer countries, they insist on better living conditions and thicker profit margins 
(Taylor, 2009, p: 24). While Chinese cluster in Chinatowns and spark a racist backlash, they 
work harder in harsher circumstances and that stands as an inspiration in its model of 
development(Taylor, 2009, p: 24). China is both a powerful inspiration and a real motor of 
development for Angola. Angolan leaders should look to China as a model of development 
because it is important that they acknowledge that Angola’s development will only come 
through the leaders themselves. Against the traditional understanding that Chinese 
involvement cannot transform Angola’s economy for the better, to eradicate poverty and also 
to spark high speed growth, this paper finds that China is already in the process of 
transforming Angola through its economic initiatives, however development lies in the hands 
of Angolans themselves. 
Angola could therefore be merged into China’s economic model but also bear in mind, as 
argued earlier, turning Angola into a developed country is not China’s goals but China 
helping Angola in order to develop themselves is possible through the Sino-Angola relation. 
Angolans have long been told by others that they must take advantage of the opportunities of 
globalization. As the Chinese secretary general of an NGO, Network for International 
Exchange, maintained in January 2007 at the Seventh World Social Forum meeting in 
Nairobi, Kenya, we Chinese had to make the same hard decision on whether to accept foreign 
investment many, many years ago (Sujian and Baogang, 2010, 141). You have to make the 
right decision or you will lose, lose, lose and remain poor, poor, poor combinations with the 
world market, however helpful, is not a uniquely Chinese formula to development but major 
development initiatives with the world market revenues acts as an essential ingredient (Sujian 
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and Baogang, 2010, 141). Let’s treat China, for Angola, as both a model and a motor of 
development. Angola has barely begun to join the East Asian flock which is doing 
remarkably well in terms of development. It is of importance that Angola takes exceptional 
steps to developing itself and begins treating China as a model and motor for the country’s 
twenty-first century success. As unthinkable as it may seem to Angolan’s, it is possible and 
China stands as a satisfactory model of development which can help transform most of the 
country for the better. However Angola still has some challenges that need to be addressed as 
they turn to hinder the country from achieving its development objectives.  
Some likely challenges to Angola’s development:  
For years, as a former Cold War battleground, Angola has stood out on world league tables of 
‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states. Its national oil company is of world class. In recent years its 
economy has grown at a feverish annual rate of 18 percent. Its government has successfully 
ended years of violent conflict, consolidated its political base and negotiated profitable deals 
with major public and private bodies of the United States, Europe and China. Even after 
billions of dollars and years spent on aid and development projects Angola remains as one of 
the poorest nations in the world. It is about time for Angola to take a 100 percent 
responsibility for its development objectives because neither China nor America can in the 
dominant discourse, save Angola from the resource curse in which the profits from 
commodity exports serve only the interests of the African countries elites. Before the paper 
offers passable implications in the coming chapter it is firstly important to provide a brief 
discussion of some likely challenges to Angola’s development objectives. In order for Angola 
to succeed under the proposed new economic development paradigm, the country must 
cultivate a sense of urgency in overcoming some of the likely challenges currently 
confronting it. These challenges include: 
I. Pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Firstly this paper will provide a brief discussion of the MDG’s, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that were established following the 
Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, following the adoption of the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration. All 189 United Nations member states at the time (there are 
193 currently) and at least 23 global organizations dedicated to help attain the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015, the goals are as follow: eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger, achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and the 
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empowerment of women, reduction of child mortality rates, the improvement of maternal 
health, the combating of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, the insurance of 
environmental sustainability and the development of a global partnership for development 
(United Nations, 2005, 7). The development condition in Angola calls for a requirement to 
keep up with the pursuit of the MDGs. Indeed, the sharp increase in oil production and 
important investment have brought about incredible improvements in the living conditions of 
many Angolans over the recent years, however poverty, both income and human poverty is 
still quite visible in the country preventing the country from attaining its development. 
II. Corruption 
The obviously high incidence of corruption constitutes a major challenge to the successful 
implementation of any new development strategies in Angola. Corruption in Angola 
promotes the diversion, depletion and misallocation of scarce resources, as well as an 
increase in the costs of production of goods and services. It results in incompetent state 
ownership, extreme private accumulation and widening inequalities. The lack of transparency 
and accountability associated with corruption prevents public participation in the decision-
making process thus, limiting positive developmental outcomes (Jian, 2011, 80). Corruption 
in Angola misrepresents fiscal discipline and delays institution of good corporate governance 
practices (Jian, 2011, 80). Human Rights Watch describes the huge corruption and 
mismanagement in the country, especially in the oil sector. For example, from 1997-2002, 
over $4 billion in oil revenues, more than 10% of GDP, bypassed the state system and likely 
went to Dos Santos and others. Dos Santos’ almost three decades in power has shown that 
even poorly performing autocracies can last a long time (Jian, 2011, 81-82). After Libyan 
Muammar Gadhafi’s death, President Dos Santos rivals Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang 
for the unwanted title of longest serving African dictator. While dos Santos’ lengthy rule has 
meant some degree of political stability, in 2007 Angola ranked 42
nd
 out of 48 nations for 
poor progress in sub-Saharan Africa on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance list (Jian, 
2011, 83). While things are improving, bureaucratic corruption remains an operational 
challenge to doing business. By preserving high anti-corruption standards and working with 
establishments to root out corruption development will be attained without any dependence 
on Global powers such as China.   
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III. State Bureaucracy: 
Currently, Angola is a one-party state. Despite elections and constitutions, democracy’s 
development has been restricted in Angola. The policymaking is the highest power and there 
are a few checks on the President’s power. Angola has the second largest oil reserves in sub-
Saharan Africa and the largest natural gas reserves (Yasutami and Hideo, 2013, 106). A 
group of dictatorial elites controls the country’s oil reserves and they are under little pressure 
to change their ways. Angola is very much a petro state, where the vast majority of 
government incomes come from oil and the country’s industry is concentrated on the energy 
sector. Incidence of the “Dutch disease” has meant that other industries have ceased to 
develop (Yasutami and Hideo, 2013, 106). The World Bank labels the investment 
environment in Angola as encouraging due to the country’s successful history of resource 
exploration however issues with State Bureaucracy stand as a major disadvantage. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
It is with no doubt that Angola is endowed with some of Africa’s richest natural resources, 
therefore using Angola as an indication of how African countries can achieve development is 
of importance.   Angola was the world’s fastest-growing economy for the first 10 years of the 
new millennium and it continues to be among the fastest-growing economies on the 
continent. This growth has been fueled by significant FDI capital inflows, owing to Angola’s 
substantial oil and mineral reserves. Angola is the third-biggest economy in sub-Saharan 
Africa after South Africa and Nigeria, with a growing middle class and an increasingly 
diversifying economy (Corkin, 2011, 2). Angola's progress is best described by its diplomatic 
ties with Global economic powers (Corkin, 2011, 1). Angola is China's largest trading partner 
in Africa and it is also China's single largest source of oil as indicated using Fig 3 found in 
the Appendix. But Western oil companies have many projects in Angola, and Luanda has 
sought to expand its ties with a multiplicity of countries from France to India to the United 
States. The increasing links between China and Angola are forcing us to ask a number of 
questions to bring about the prediction of the possible changes that could occur for Angola. 
Such as, will the Angolan elites be able to bring about development from the benefits 
obtained from the Sino-Angola relation or will they place their country at the risk of painfully 
repeating the colonialism experience with China?  In search for an answer, the last Chapter of 
the paper aims at bringing suitable conclusion as well as implication that can help Angola 
achieve its development objectives through its relationship with China.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The debate over the relative pros and cons of the Washington Consensus and the Beijing 
Consensus owes its significance to the existence of the crippling debts most African states 
toil under. The involvement of the two international system superpowers in Angola in the 
21st century has naturally sparked debates over whether their involvement will propel Angola 
towards achieving its development objectives or not. The aim of the paper was to show that 
there exists a satisfying difference between the Washington and the Beijing Consensuses to 
justify the debate of whether any of these two consensuses can help African countries such as 
Angola to achieve their development objectives. The main strengths of thoughts or what is 
important from this research is proving the hypothesis which is; neither the Washington nor 
the Beijing Consensus is the ultimate model of achieving Angola’s development objectives. 
Ultimately both consensuses have a lot to provide Angola, the degree of their success if any 
will depend entirely on the role played by African countries such as Angola. Let us not forget 
that China’s interests in Africa is not much different from those of the Western powers which 
is motivated by resource interest and yes it is true, there will always be a need for external 
help in Africa, but Africa also needs to establish strong economic roots and possibly grow to 
the level of its current investors. Many of the glorified investors have shown obvious interest 
in Africa’s natural resources and have looked for the weak point among the Africans to create 
division among them; Sudan stands as a notable example.  
Many foreign companies who claim to be investors exploit both the African human and 
natural resources and in turn contribute too little or nothing towards Africa’s development 
objectives. These investors have continuously misled the few in control while the majority 
lived in extreme poverty.  Leaving this control to Africans does not mean external investors 
are not needed but the Africans should be the ones to command what they want and what 
they do not want, like the crude oil crises in Nigeria shown in Fig: 6, where there are no 
adequate laws that make oil companies compensate the communities when there is an oil 
spillage or so, let there be transparency and accountability (Yasutami and Hideo, 2013, 106). 
These foreign investors should not interfere in the governance of these African countries, 
seeing that their intervention has previously led some African countries to civil war. So with 
this at the back of every African government’s mind, they should be ready to face the 
challenges and not wait for aid and global powers to come and help Africa to develop.  
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6.1 Main points of the paper:            Chapter 1 
At the beginning of this paper we provided an introduction that laid down the historical 
overview of Angola, bringing to the reader’s attention crucial information such the fact that 
Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and subsequently fell into an extensive 
civil war that lasted for 27 years until 2002. It was also noted that since the end of the war, 
Angola has focused on post-war reconstruction and has made remarkable improvement in the 
development of its economy, largely pushed by its oil productions. Relations with countries 
that play a leading role in the Global economic scale have always been in the forefront of 
Angola’s development agenda.  In addition these important Global players such as the West 
and China have been driven to Angola for trade relations grounded on oil, diamonds, coffee, 
timber and other mineral resources that stand as Angola’s chief exports. In short, Chapter one 
introduced and sketched the questions that have encouraged this study. This Chapter outlined 
the important aspects of this paper such as the aim and rationale, literature review, hypothesis 
as well as the research method. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 was aimed at introducing the reader to the concept of China-Africa historical 
relation and effectively discussing Africa’s historical background. As noted within the 
context of the paper the Sino-Africa relations first began in the early 1950s. Before 1955, 
Africa was of no importance to China, however from then onwards, China pursued 
international recognition and political partners with the hope of strengthening its international 
associations against the capitalist West and the revisionist communist Soviet Union. In 
addition Chapter 2 provided an adequate discussion of what is meant by development. Within 
the paper development was defined as improvement in skill and ability; not only as capital 
accumulation and economic growth but also improvement in the standard of living 
Development that includes growth, embraces aspects of life such as social justice, equal 
opportunities for all citizens, equitable distribution of income and the democratisation of the 
development process. This chapter also provided the main features of China’s interaction 
with Angola. Furthermore, argued the main features of China’s Foreign Policy pillars towards 
Angola. Correspondingly, provided an acceptable discussion of China’s evolving role in 
Angola?  Lastly debated China’s evolving role in Angola, further arguing that the China-
Angola relation is based on the following three components namely loan, natural resources as 
well as investment.  
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Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 firstly, defined what the Washington Consensus is. As noted within the context of 
the paper the phrase Washington Consensus was first coined by John Williamson in 1989 in 
his work where he presented the shortfall of Latin American reforms and identified areas that 
needed additional upgrading. It merely expressed the widely held view in Washington and by 
international development institutions that there is a path that developing countries’ economic 
reforms must follow to captivate aid efficiently. The Washington consensus encompasses ten 
rules namely, fiscal discipline, tax reform, re-ordering public expenditure priorities, 
competitive exchange rate, privatization, trade liberalization, liberalizing interest rates, 
deregulation, liberalizing of inward FDI and property rights. Chapter 3 further presented 
some of the most important aspects of the paper such as the analysis of the earlier Western 
attempts in Angola through the Washington Consensus bringing to the reader’s attention that 
Angola’s relation dates back to the early years of independence. As noted within the paper 
that following the 1975 war of independence from Portugal, the country broke out into civil 
war. The war was fought between the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA and a number of other 
political parties (Victoria, 1998, 1). During this time Angola was facing an enormous 
agricultural crisis, which harshly limited the source of food. The Soviets and the US provided 
aid and it is understood that the US donated over 100 million dollars’ worth of food (Victoria, 
1998, 1). By the end of the 1980’s the foreign powers had almost completely pulled out of 
Angola and it looked as if peace and democracy was on the horizon. The year 1993 marked a 
turning point for Angola in terms of foreign aid because the United States officially 
recognized the Angolan government and started political associations with it. 
 Ensuing, Chapter 3 provided an overview of the earlier Western attempts through the 
Washington Consensus, evaluating the empirical role played by the Washington Consensus 
towards Angola’s development objectives. Within this chapter the role played by the key 
Washington Consensus institutions such as IMF and WB was also observed. As noted within 
the chapter that even after billions of dollars and years spent on aid and development projects 
Angola remains as one of the poorest nations in the world. Perhaps the US should have paid 
more attention to turning Angola into a sustainable business partner rather than simply 
throwing money at them. Although Angola is now richer than it had been before, the prospect 
of true development remains weak. Poor public organizations, corruption, and dependency 
are among the difficulties that continue to hinder Angola from achieving development 
objectives. 
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Chapter 4 
The aim of Chapter 4 was to provide an assessment of the Beijing Consensus. As indicated 
within the chapter the Beijing consensus originated from the published work of Joshua 
Cooper Ramo in 2004, where he labelled the social and economic change of China as the new 
physics of power and development. Change under the Beijing consensus was rooted in three 
ideologies, namely Innovation, Pursuit of Dynamic Goals/Rejection of Per Capita GDP and 
self-determination. By the first component, China’s economic achievement was entrenched in 
continuous innovations that upgraded its total factor productivity, while the second signifies 
China’s pursuit for economic development which was not restricted to growth but justifiable 
distribution of wealth. The third component represents the capability of China to plan and 
preserve her developmental polices as a model for other countries to follow and imitate. 
Consequently, the term Beijing consensus was the sum of the three pillars of the economic 
policies of China over the years which comprised reform, innovation and experimentation, 
export-led growth, state capitalism and authoritarianism.  
Specifically, Chapter 4 provided an overview of Angola’s move from the Washington to the 
Beijing Consensus supported by fig 4A as well as 4B provided in the appendix, arguing that 
when the United States emerged as the conquering nation at the end of the Cold War the 
“Washington Consensus” became the only strong trustworthy development model for 
Angola. With the financial crisis in 2008, China’s economic success and Angola’s 
dependence on China, the Washington Consensus started losing its standing in Angola. The 
downfall of the Washington Consensus in Angola has been so dramatic that some critics 
argued that the policies imposed were never intended to enhance development. On the 
contrary, the Washington Consensus policies focused a lot on the economic aspects of 
development and leading Angola to serious dependence on loans offered by the IMF and the 
WB. This serves as one of the most important reason for China’s increasing African 
engagement which threatens to challenge the Washington Consensus. Chapter 4 also 
evaluated the empirical role played by China through the use of the Beijing Consensus, such 
as the  eight principles declared by China for economic aid and technical assistance in 
Angola. China’s presence in Angola presents a fascinating case study of China’s oil interest 
in Africa and there is a complex interplay of benefits and challenges.  
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Chapter 5 
In order to achieve a detailed analysis, Chapter 5 started off by providing an adequate 
discussion of Angola’s performance under the consensuses. Within this chapter it was noted 
that Angola still continues to apply the principles of both consensuses in its economic 
policies, however the road to development remains unclear with very little consideration for 
growth potentials. Chapter 5 also provided criticisms of both Consensuses arguing that the 
Washington Consensus has been understood to mean bashing the state, a new imperialism 
and the creation of a laissez-faire global economy, that the only thing that matters is the 
growth of GDP.  The tragedy of the Washington Consensus’ approach to aiding Africa with 
structural adjustment has been so intense that some critics argued that the policies imposed on 
African countries were never intended to approve development. Under the Washington 
Consensus, African states have been required to cut back or abandon the very same 
requirements which helped developed countries to prosper in their development path. The 
Washington Consensus policies focused a lot on the economic features of development 
driving African countries such as Angola to be more reliant on loans offered by the IMF and 
the WB.  
In addition the paper also enlightened that United States and Western critics strongly argue 
that the Chinese engagement in Africa is mainly a form of crude mercantilism and political 
interventionism that directly threatens U.S interest and calls for confrontation, condemnation 
and containment. The Western countries strongly claim that China is guilty of backing 
corrupt political elites in ‘rogue states’ in exchange for exploitation rights or other forms of 
access to raw materials. Critics also strongly argue that China is ignoring corruption and 
failing to support better-quality social and environmental standards in Africa.In the case of 
Angola the Chinese require that 70% of projects be given to Chinese firms which mean that 
the majority of the funds are going to Chinese firms.It was through the criticism and the 
survey provided within the chapter that one notes that China’s interests in Angola is not very 
different from those of the Western powers which is motivated by resource interest. The 
survey was also of importance as it was conducted through the use of the University of the 
Witwatersrand Postgraduate students from a wide range of disciplinary fields. The aim of the 
survey was to highlight scholar’s perceptions of the growing China-Angola relationship. 
Questions that were asked to the participants were as follows; what do you think of the 
growing China-Angola relationship towards Angola’s development objectives as compared to 
earlier Western attempts through the Washington Consensus? Do you think the China-Angola 
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relation is on basis of a win-win association or it is new imperialism? Is China hampering 
African countries’ development strategies by its extraction of raw materials, ignorance of 
corruption and the provision of aid and military equipment to these countries regardless of 
their quality of governance and of their human rights records? Is it in China’s interest to help 
Angola/Africa to develop? Lastly, how well or badly would you say the government is 
handling Angola’s development objectives? In addition chapter five offered suggestions on 
how Angola can manage a balanced relationship with this strong growing economy and 
satisfactory suggestions for Angola’s development. Within this section it was noted that 
China stands as a satisfactory model of development which can help transform most of the 
country for the better. However Angola still has some challenges that need to be addressed as 
they turn to hinder the country from achieving its development objectives. In order for 
Angola to succeed under the proposed new economic development paradigm, the country 
must cultivate a sense of urgency in overcoming some of the likely challenges currently 
confronting it. These challenges include: pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), corruption and state bureaucracy.  
6.2 Which (if any) is better for achieving Angola’s and Africa’s development objectives: 
the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus?  
Having presented the role played by both the Washington and the Beijing Consensus one can 
finally return to the question as to which model between the Washington and the Beijing 
Consensus is best suitable for attaining Angola’s development objectives and Africa in 
general. Before one can offers a satisfactory answer to the above set question it is firstly 
important to note that the problem when discussing African development is that, so often, 
what is best for Africa is decided not by African officials but by policy‐makers in 
Washington or Beijing. The Washington Consensus, as the previous hegemon, has been 
involved in Angola for several decades (for better or worse). Previously unchallenged, it 
forced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) unto Angola which in exchange for its 
assistance. On the other hand China’s approach to bilateral relations and economic 
development, characterized by Joshua Cooper Ramo as the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ provides an 
alternative to development for Angola. After all, assistance via the Beijing Consensus comes 
with just as many conditions as there are attached to gestures via the Washington Consensus. 
The difference is that China’s conditions are more concerned with practical considerations 
and less so with abstract requirements like human rights.  The decision of which consensus is 
better, if any ,between the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus is not just 
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academic; it has real life implications for the citizens of African states.  To cite the Chinese 
proverb, the Chinese are providing fish for the Angolans, but are not teaching them how to 
fish. However, there is no requirement, or perhaps even expectation, that foreign nations 
should develop the countries in which they are investing. The China-Angola relationship has 
grown strong over decades in part due to the frequent contact between the leaders of the two 
nations and that does not mean it is in China’s foreign policy objective to develop Angola. 
The essence of the paper lies in the argument that the best model for Angola is neither the 
Washington nor the Beijing consensus, but one that emerges from within Angola or Africa in 
general. However, Angola could occasionally draw lessons or inspiration from the two 
models. It is these new ways of thinking that will help influence the establishment or the 
development of the real African Consensus and open the way to the renewal of Africa’s 
progress. If there are Beijing Consensus and Mumbai Consensus from India, where is the 
African Consensus? The lesson here is that both China and India have not abandoned the 
principles of the Washington Consensus but have appropriated them into their innate 
traditional values and mixed both ideals reasonably well for their progress. 
 6.3 Implication for Angola’s and Africa’s development objectives 
In order for African countries to even begin emerging from the current economic situation 
there is need for development strategies that fit the exclusive nature of the continent. This 
requires a clear break from the past and a change in vision. In approving alternative tactics, 
planners must take awareness of differences in social-economic and political structures. A 
wholesome adoption of both the West and Chinese models is not desirable given that the 
world’s economy has changed expressively from since these two countries adopted their 
respective models, but helpful tactics within the two models could be adopted. An 
appreciated alternative model for Africa therefore must be exclusive to the nature of its 
African economies. Based on the understandings of China and taking knowledge of the 
realities of the African economic setting, there is need to fashion a new developmental 
strategy for Africa. The thrust of such developmental tactic must be concentrated towards 
harnessing the continent’s rich natural resources and managing them in such a way that will 
allow the continent to turn into a major player in the global economy without sacrificing the 
need for a comprehensive development. This can be done through government interference 
and later acceptance of free market to endorse economic growth. To this end, some of the 
strategies that can kick start Africa’s economic transformation are suggested below: 
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Regional integration 
Regional integration has certainly confirmed to be the continent’s main challenge, 
irrespective of the fact that several countries in Africa fit in to one regional grouping or the 
other. Although there have been some accomplishments across some of these alliances such 
as the free movement of persons and customs union in the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (Li, 2006, 167). These accomplishments have to be strengthened 
and duplicated across Africa to further encourage the inter-complementarity of goods, trade 
assistance and free movements of the factor of production, amongst others (Li, 2006, 167). 
The procedure of integration would also help in regional infrastructure development in 
serious areas like energy, transportation, communication systems, roads and rail 
transportation. This would decrease manufacture costs and increase economic undertakings 
across the continent. In addition, it would also build up Africa’s political voice; improve 
shared negotiations to achieve more promising results on the external front. Other benefits 
would include improved admission to international markets and reasonable price for resource 
exploitation as well as inviting investment flows to the continent.  
Investment in human capital 
Africa has a young population in comparison to the ageing citizens across the world. Skill 
achievement is critical to turn this source into wealth. For example, in order for the industrial 
sector to take off the new development strategy, it must avoid the current uneven approach to 
education which is not modified to the developmental needs of the African economies, hence; 
emphasis should be located on modifying education to growth sectors (Roselyn, 2013, 18). 
Education and technology would allow African countries to adjust more quickly to the 
challenges of globalization as initiatives become more flexible and better able to understand 
using the new technology. As such an incorporated approach to education would enhance 
human resources development and create adequate skilled manpower anticipated for the 
enhancement of African countries to become maintainable finished goods exporters. Other 
important features include institution of good governance and zero tolerance for corruption 
and good governance attached on the rule of law are vital for sustainable development. 
Strong political commitment is essential to address corruption and improve efficiency. Like 
China, African countries should inspire the implementation of a zero tolerance policy against 
corruption by introducing severe penalty to punish and control/eliminate corruption. 
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6.4 Suggestions for future researchers 
Africa, with its significant amount of natural resources, regional market size and human 
resources ought to be a marginal player in the global economy; with the apparent failure of 
the Washington Consensus as applied in a number of African countries and the possibility of 
the unsustainability of the Beijing consensus in the long-run. It is clear that neither the 
Washington nor the Beijing Consensus is a suitable model for attaining Angola’s and 
Africa’s development objectives. Africans should deviate from the idea that only the 
developed countries can lead Africa to successful development and should learn from the 
likes of Japan, India, China and many other countries that have started from nothing and have 
gradually bettered themselves. It is of great importance that African countries strive for 
economic development from within the continent itself in the coming years so as to reach 
ground where they can hold their own and possibly come to the realisation that the best 
model for Africa is not either the Washington consensus nor the Beijing consensus, but one 
that may come from within Africa.  
African states must establish a model that will suit African countries’ interest and develop the 
majority of African countries if not all. There exists a need for a paradigm shift in Africa’s 
development strategies in order to acquire sustainable economic development by coming up 
with an African Consensus. This new Consensus should identify development paths that 
focus on a pragmatic commitment to progressive change as a possible alternative to the 
current development strategy. The question remains whether Africa can leverage on the  its 
potentials of huge natural resources, regional market size and human resources to formulate a 
radical development strategy that fit its realities and cultures without relying on the 
Washington and the Beijing consensus in order to achieve its development objectives.     
The implications of the structure of African economies need to be critically appraised in order 
to identify an appropriate African Consensus for its development model. In the future it 
would be of importance for scholars to focus on how the possible African invented consensus 
can become a success. Vast amounts of focus must be directed towards important aspects 
such as the most crucial objectives that this proposed African Consensus must encompass and 
how those objectives will help in achieving development. In this regard, an African invented 
consensus can include a framework that embraces regional integration, unity amongst African 
states in achieving their development objectives. Africa can gain a lot through unity as 
indicated in the appendix Fig 6, dominant role in international trade, self-reliance,  
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development of critical infrastructural to help export finished goods instead of raw materials 
and economic liberation by ensuring a paradigm shift from a system of dependence on 
foreign aid. Future researchers’ focus on the proposed African Consensus will be helpful as it 
will provide scholars and policy makers with literature assessing and examining the success 
of this African Consensus aimed at achieving African countries development objectives. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
The need for radical re-thinking on development strategies is imperative for African countries 
in order for them to become relevant in the global economy. This is further strengthened by 
the plain certainty of life-threatening poverty in Africa. Over the years, the part of Africa in 
global trade continued to be irrelevant regardless of the application of the policies that were 
suggested by international financial and development institutions, such as the IMF and the 
WB. The dismal performance of African economies calls to question, the effectiveness of the 
economic ideologies being prescribed by international institutions points to the need for a 
paradigm shift in order to achieve sustainable development. Over the last quarter of a century, 
Africa has been at the receiving end of substantial custom from these institutions that have 
insistently encouraged, amongst others things; free trade, privatization of state-owned 
initiatives, intellectual property rights protection and deregulation of foreign FDI as 
necessities for developing countries to develop.  
This policy prescription was what John Williamson coined the Washington Consensus. This 
neo-liberal ideology is reflected in the policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions: the IMF 
and the WB. Specifically, both the IMF and the WB condition their offers of assistance to 
African countries on the strict adherence to the Washington Consensus policies. The 
Consensus had continued to be under severe criticism because the performances of countries 
that adopted its doctrine, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the former 
Soviet bloc showed that it had failed to deliver sustained growth as promised by its 
promoters. On the other hand the remarkable economic growth of China in the past 30 years, 
with the country having declined to adopt the original and extended framework of the 
Washington Consensus, has raised further doubt on the reliability of its capabilities. 
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 The significant economic miracle of China which has been described as the Beijing 
Consensus by Joshua Cooper Ramo represents a symbol of China’s success and a challenge 
to the Washington consensus. The Beijing consensus is enshrined in three principles namely: 
innovation, pursuit of dynamic goals/rejection of per capita GDP and theory of self-
determination. These tenets are embedded in the policies of China that features incremental 
reform, innovation and experimentation, export-led growth, state capitalism and 
authoritarianism. Even though the Beijing consensus had recorded significant success, it has, 
however, been argued, that it might not be maintainable in the long-run as it keeps large state-
owned sectors and authoritarianism, which runs different to many African country’s 
ambitions. In addition, a historical review of how the advanced countries developed show 
that they did not adopt policies that they are recommending for the developing countries. As 
pointed out by Ha-Joon Chang (2003), some of the policies that the Bretton Wood institutions 
kick against today, were the very policies they adopted for their development. For example, 
the WTO currently opposes the use of export subsidy and protection of infant industry, 
whereas the United Kingdom and the United States embraced these policies in their early 
stages of development. There is therefore, the need for pragmatic policies and institutions that 
best suit the developmental stages and realities of African countries in order to achieve 
sustainable development (Ha-Joon, 2003). 
Ultimately it is up to African governments to make whatever internal changes necessary to 
ensure development and to make an external decision as to which consensus (if either) would 
best serve African interests. Whether African countries choose the Washington Consensus or 
the Beijing Consensus, what remains vital is that they need to acknowledge the fact that 
different states require different approaches towards achieving development. Although, most 
African Countries have continued to apply the principles of both consensuses in their 
economic policies, the road to development remains bleak with very little consideration for 
their growth potentials. Over the past years, both the Washington consensus and the Beijing 
Consensus have injected billions of dollars funding numerous development missions in a 
number of African countries. Regardless of all this, African counties, especially sub-Saharan 
Africa have simply failed to achieve their development objectives. Corruption and 
misconduct of public funds, possessions and resources are becoming the order of the day. The 
reason for this is relatively the fact that we have resources whose value we do not know. As 
individuals, we typically look after what we value and we frequently value what we work 
hard for.  
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Having said that, it is highly important for African countries to work hard towards coming up 
with an African-made Consensus merely aimed at achieving African development objectives. 
With the help from future researchers assessing the possible success of the proposed 
Consensus before implementation, African countries such as Angola are indeed guaranteed to 
achieve their desired development objectives. After all Africa is known for its resource 
wealth and that is the utmost opportunity. African countries must set aside their intra-
continental differences and unite in order to maximise the opportunities available. Africa is 
appealing to the international financial community due to its resource abundance. Major 
focus is entirely on our continent and we need rise to the occasion. We cannot afford to 
disappoint, this is our chance to make a remarkable impact on the International platform and 
we need to utilize it.  
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Appendix 
Fig 1: Map showing Angola 
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Fig 2: Cartoon Image demonstrating China’s non-intervention approach towards Angola  
 
Fig 3: Shows how Angola has become China’s leading energy supplier, Picture from the 
BBC Website “http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/picture” 
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Fig 4 A: Cartoon Image signifying from the Washington to the Beijing consensus, discusses 
the new road towards the development of Angola 
 
Fig 4 B: Cartoon Image representing Angola’s move from Washington to Beijing consensus 
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Fig 5: From the Washington to the Beijing consensus, China’s investment in Angola 
 
Fig 6: Chinese-Built Housing Development in Angola a ‘Ghost Town’ 
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Fig 7: Picture displaying that $6 Billion Lost Yearly To Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria. Picture 
taken from the Atlanta Black Star website:“http://atlantablackstar.com/2012/05/15/6-billion-
lost-yearly-to-crude-oil-theft-in-nigeria-while-fiscal-crisis-looms/” 
 
Fig 8: Cartoon Image signifying African Unity (Africa’s Consensus)  
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